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Abstract
An emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly communities 
maintains that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing short-
term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects. The forces inducing 
managerial myopia are easy to spot, typically embodied by activist hedge funds 
and Wall Street gadflies with outsized appetites for next quarter’s earnings. 
Warnings about the dangers of “short termism” have become so well established, 
in fact, that they are now driving changes to mainstream practice, as courts, 
regulators and practitioners fashion legal and transactional constraints designed 
to insulate firms and managers from the influence of investor short-termism. This 
Article draws on academic research and a series of case studies to advance the 
thesis that the emergent folk wisdom about short-termism is incomplete. A growing 
literature in behavioral finance and psychology now provides sound reasons to 
conclude that corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive 
optimism about their own long-term projects. We illustrate several plausible 
instantiations of such biases using case studies from three prominent companies 
where managers have arguably succumbed to a form of “long-termism” in their 
own corporate stewardship. Unchecked, long-termism can impose substantial 
costs on investors that are every bit as damaging as short-termism. Moreover, we 
argue that long-term managerial bias sheds considerable light on the paradox of 
why short-termism evidently persists among supposedly sophisticated financial 
market participants: Shareholder activism—even if unambiguously myopic—can 
provide a symbiotic counter-ballast against managerial long-termism. Without a 
more definitive understanding of the interaction between short- and long-term 
biases, then, policymakers should be cautious about embracing reforms that 
focus solely on half of the problem.
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Abstract: An emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly 
communities maintains that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing 
short-term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects.  The forces 
inducing managerial myopia are easy to spot, typically embodied by activist hedge 
funds and Wall Street gadflies with outsized appetites for next quarter’s earnings. 
Warnings about the dangers of “short termism” have become so well established, 
in fact, that they are now driving changes to mainstream practice, as courts, 
regulators and practitioners fashion legal and transactional constraints designed to 
insulate firms and managers from the influence of investor short-termism.  This 
Article draws on academic research and a series of case studies to advance the 
thesis that the emergent folk wisdom about short-termism is incomplete.  A growing 
literature in behavioral finance and psychology now provides sound reasons to 
conclude that corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive 
optimism about their own long-term projects. We illustrate several plausible 
instantiations of such biases using case studies from three prominent companies 
where managers have arguably succumbed to a form of “long-termism” in their own 
corporate stewardship. Unchecked, long-termism can impose substantial costs on 
investors that are every bit as damaging as short-termism. Moreover, we argue that 
long-term managerial bias sheds considerable light on the paradox of why short-
termism evidently persists among supposedly sophisticated financial market 
participants: Shareholder activism—even if unambiguously myopic—can provide a 
symbiotic counter-ballast against managerial long-termism. Without a more 
definitive understanding of the interaction between short- and long-term biases, 
then, policymakers should be cautious about embracing reforms that focus solely on 
half of the problem. 
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“Here we are, when you look at what has happened, what did you do wrong? 
Well, one, I don’t think the story is yet played out...A lot of tech turnarounds do 
take five, six, seven years.”  
 
Marissa Mayer, March 11, 2016 
 
“My opinion is that, philosophically, I’m doing the right thing in trying to shake 
up some of these managements. It’s a problem in America today that we are not 
nearly as productive as we should be.” 
 
Carl Icahn, October 22, 2014 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The perceived dangers of “short-termism” in public capital markets have come to 
occupy center stage as a chief concern for corporate America. During the last decade, an 
emerging conventional wisdom has taken root among lawyers, business commentators, 
judges, policymakers and (at least some) investors, asserting that managers of public 
companies are too often pressured to pursue short-term gains at the expense of managing 
for long-term value.  
 
Although concerns about short-termism in capital markets are hardly new1 (ebbing and 
flowing for over a quarter century2), the recent rise of hedge fund activism and corporate 
governance intermediation has added a sense of urgency—if not emergency—to the critical 
chorus warning of the perils of myopia. Leo Strine, the sitting Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court, has cautioned that “there is a danger that activist stockholders will make 
proposals motivated by interests other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable 
profitability of the corporation.”3 Martin Lipton, a consensus patriarch of company-side 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), echoes these concerns, issuing stern rebukes to activists 
who, he argues, “are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in 
                                               
1 As far back as 1980, a provocative and influential article in the Harvard Business Review predicted that 
corporate management’s “devotion to short-term returns and management by the numbers” was bringing 
about “a decline in competitiveness of U.S. companies.” Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy, 
Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 58 HARV. BUS. REV. 67, 70, 77 (July/Aug. 1980).  
2  See e.g., Kevin J. Laverty, Economic "Short-Termism": The Debate, the Unresolved Issues, and the 
Implications for Management Practice and Research, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825, 825 (1996).    
3 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be 
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term? 66 BUS. 
LAW. 1, 8 (2010) [hereinafter Strine, Fundamental Question]; See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When 
the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate 
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1885 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds] (“human investors 
are exposed to…changes in corporate behavior influenced by stock market forces such as hedge fund 
activism: a short-term increase in productivity and stock price at the expense of long-term reinvestment and 
wage growth will likely harm the overall ‘portfolio’ of the human investor.”) 
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the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value.”4 “This pervasive short-
termism,”  Lipton cautions, “is eroding the overall economy and putting our nation at a 
major competitive disadvantage.”5  
 
Much of the ensuing debate about short-termism has tended to revolve around 
competing claims concerning the phenomenon in isolation. Many skeptics, for example, 
have rejoined that arbitrage activity in efficient capital markets should create a natural 
corrective mechanism that eviscerates (or substantially dampens) most short-term biases.6 
Others have questioned the magnitude of the phenomenon,7 or argued that claims about 
short-termism are little more than disingenuous apologies for managerial agency costs and 
empire building.8 Nevertheless, manifest concerns about the perils of short-termism—and 
the existential threat it poses for long-term value creation—continue to dominate both the 
public discourse9 and some influential corners of academic research.10 And, a host of legal 
                                               
4  Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (March 9, 2013) [hereinafter Lipton, Important Questions], available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/ 
5  Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Board of Directors in 2017, HARV. L. SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (December 8, 2016) [hereinafter Lipton, Some Thoughts 2017], available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/08/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2017/ 
6 See e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-termism -- In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 
977, 987  (2013) (“If	short-term	stock	market	pressures	are	inducing	firms	to	give	up	value	over	the	long	 run,	 then firms and markets would find themselves with incentives to develop institutions and 
mechanisms to facilitate that long-run profitability“); Jonathan Macey, Their Bark Is Bigger Than Their Bite: 
An Essay on Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite, 126 YALE L.J. F. 526, 535 (2017) (“The efficient capital 
market hypothesis implies that it is virtually impossible for an activist hedge fund to outperform the market 
without illegally using material inside information unless they improve corporate performance.”). 
7  See e.g., Steve N. Kaplan, Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some Thoughts, NBER 
WORKING PAPER NO. W23464 (2017) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980552 (despite ongoing short-termism concerns 
“corporate profits are near all-time highs”). 
8 See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1137 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects]. But see John C. Coffee, 
Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 
J. CORP. L. 545, 551, 627-630 (2016) (“We think this assumption that managements typically engage in 
inefficient empire-building is today out of date and ignores the impact of major changes in executive 
compensation.”). For a broader discussion see infra part IV.B.1. 
9 The Harvard Business Review recently published an article confirming that “Yes, Short-Termism Really is 
a Problem,” and dedicated a whole volume to “Managing for the Long-Term.” See Rojer L. Martin, Yes, 
Short-Termism Really is a Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct 9, 2015) available at https://hbr.org/2015/10/yes-
short-termism-really-is-a-problem. Managing for The Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV.  (May-June 2017) 
available at https://hbr.org/2017/05/managing-for-the-long-term. 
10 See e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at  574-576 (surveying studies that find that hedge fund activism is 
associated with a decline in R&D investment); See also Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil & Pab Jotikasthira, 
Governance under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, REV. FIN. (FORTHCOMING 2019) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2356544 (finding that activism affects also firms that were not directly 
targeted). Cf. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Song Ma & Xuan Tian, How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape 
Corporate Innovation? 130 J. OF FIN. ECON. 237 (2018) [hereinafter, Brav et al., Innovation] (finding that 
target firms decrease investment in R&D but improve innovation output measured in patent counts and 
citations); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, 
Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723 (2015) [hereinafter Brav et al., Real 
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and regulatory reforms to discourage short-termism and encourage management for the 
long term are currently on the table at both state and federal levels, eliciting considerable 
debate themselves.11 At present, the kerfuffle over short-termism has attracted passionate 
participants on both sides, with the resulting battlefield resembling something close to a 
standoff. 
 
The ongoing stalemate might be due (at least in part) to the failure of advocates from 
both sides to confront seriously two curious paradoxes about their own debate.  First, even 
if episodic short-termism might conceivably emerge in appropriate capital market settings, 
its persistence over time seems difficult to explain. Why would sophisticated market 
participants, for example, deliberately and repeatedly leave money on the table during both 
economic upturns and downturns, eschewing superior long-term investments in order to 
extract a quick payout? 12  The conventional response that hedge fund managers are 
compensated to think in like short-termists rings particularly hollow: nothing requires the 
persistence of standard “two and twenty” compensation packages; and yet, hedge funds 
have generally not backed away from it (migrating to even more short-term-oriented 
compensation if anything13). The strong and positive market response to hedge fund 
                                               
Effects] (finding that target firms improve operational and allocative efficiency). Harvey Campbell, John 
Graham & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACC. & 
ECON. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Campbell et al., Financial Reporting]  (in a 2003 survey of 401 CFOs, most 
participants reported that short-term pressures might lead their firms to forgo valuable long-term 
investments); Dominic Barton et al., Rising to the Challenge of Short-Termism, FCLT GLOBAL 8-10 (2016) 
(a 2015 survey of more than 1,000 top executives reveals that executives and board members believe that 
growing short-term pressures result in too short investment time horizons), 
http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fclt-global-rising-to-the-
challenge.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Z8P-QPJJ]. 
11 For example, the proposed Brokaw Act would “fight against increasing short-termism in our economy by 
promoting transparency and strengthening oversight of activist hedge funds.” U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin 
Introduces Bipartisan Legislation to Strengthen Oversight of Predatory Hedge Funds, Press Release, US 
Senate (August 31, 2017), available at https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/brokaw-act2017; See 
also Brokaw Act, S. 1744, 115th Cong. (2017), available at 
https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brokaw%20Act%20Bill%20Text.pdf. Similarly, proposals 
to eliminate quarterly reporting requirements are winning prominent champions.  See e.g., Martin Lipton, 
The New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Feb. 3, 2016), [hereinafter Lipton, New Paradigm] available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/03/the-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/ (calling for 
elimination of quarterly reporting requirements); see also Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 3, at 1956-1969 
(proposing an array of policy responses, such as curbing shareholder’ proposals mechanism). Delaware 
courts have many times clarified directors’ fiduciary duties to align with value creation under a long-term 
horizon. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3D 17, 34 (DEL. CH. 2013) (“the duty of loyalty therefore 
mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term “); In Re Rural/Metro 
Corporation S’Holders Litig., 102 A.3D 205, 253 (DEL. CH. 2014);  In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders 
Litigation, 2018 WL 5018535 (DEL. CH. 2018); Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and 
Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 49 (2014-2015) (“the directors’ fiduciary duties … require 
that they maximize the value of the corporation over the long term.”) 
12 See e.g. Roe, supra note 6, at 987-989. 
13 Traditionally, hedge fund managers only 2% of the assets they manage and 20% on annual appreciation, a 
factor said to incentivize short-term returns. Recently, however, this 2 and 20 figure has migrated to 1 and 
20 – i.e., an even smaller reward on assets, and relative larger reward on annual, short-term, appreciation. 
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activism announcements (with largely equivocal evidence about long-term effects) 
similarly belies the possibility of episodic short-termism as an artifact of market 
pathology.14  
 
The second puzzling aspect of the current debate concerns the concept of long-term 
value creation itself, and its seemingly “deified” status as the consensus gold standard for 
corporate governance. In other words, while the clash over the existence and/or magnitude 
of short-term bias has raged on, most have been willing to stipulate that long-term value 
maximization remains a paragon objective (quibbling only about how best to realize it15). 
Throughout, it appears conventional for both sides of the debate to characterize (or at least 
presume) long-term decision making as largely unbiased,16 even as concerns over short-
termist positions sharpen. 
 
In this Article, we attempt to gain some traction on several of the above quandaries by 
introducing a novel notion of long-term bias: namely, an inclination for managers to favor 
inferior long-term projects over short-term alternatives that have superior returns. While 
short-term bias originates primarily from external sources such as capital market investors, 
long-term bias emerges internally, from managers’ assessments about their own long-term 
projects. Long-term bias, we argue, is likely to be particularly salient for managerial 
decisions makers, because (1) managers are inclined to be highly optimistic in general; (2) 
they tend to discount feedback and relevant data; and (3) they tend to receive such feedback 
more sporadically for long-term endeavors. Consequently, we argue, mangers’ long-term 
projects are particularly prone to persistent overestimation.  
 
                                               
See Lindsay Fortado, Hedge fund investors question ‘2 and 20’ fees, Fund managers criticized for focusing 
on management rather than performance fees, Financial Times (June 6, 2017), available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/291081ba-49df-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43 
14  See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randal Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance. 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) [hereinafter Brav et al., Firm Performance] ; See 
also Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 8 (finding that the initial increase in value does not fade 
within five years); Cf.  Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe, & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund 
Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (working paper 2015) (reporting that targeted firms performed less well 
in the long-term, than a matched sample of non-targeted firms). 
15 Even many short-termist hedge fund activists often see themselves as taking steps to reshape firms’ long-
term strategies. Many activists, for example, hold shares for several years, fight to nominate board members, 
establish long term strategy committees, and reshape long-term operational plans. See notes 67-68, infra, and 
accompanying text. 
16 For example, while a Google Scholar search for “short-term bias” & “corporate law” yields results, around 
100 results, a Google Scholar search for “long-term bias” & “corporate law” yields 11 results, none of which 
is relevant to corporate investment, or to the long-term bias that we discuss here. Indeed, long-termism has 
long been the darling of corporate practice and policy, frequently equated with efficiency and growth. See 
e.g., Trados, supra note 11, at  37 (“Focusing on long-term investments rather than short-term gains is the 
proper role of managers, board members and investors.”); William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 
22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 896-97 (1997) (“[I]t can be seen that the proper orientation of corporation law is the 
protection of long-term value of capital committed indefinitely to the firm.”); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 
695, 706 (Del. 2009) (“enhancing the corporation‘s long-term share value is a distinctively corporate 
concern”). 
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Optimism bias—the proclivity of corporate managers to overestimate the success 
probability of their own projects—has already been documented extensively in the 
economics and finance literature. But we distill a stronger implication yet from this 
literature: that optimism bias is likely to be amplified, less constrained, and more influential 
with respect to long-term investments. Thus, while managerial overconfidence may affect 
all investments initially, it will over time lead to a disproportional survivorship of long-
term investments–and hence, to a long-term bias. Our analysis of how and why long-term 
investments are systematically prone to overestimation draws primarily on extensive 
literatures in psychology and behavioral finance, but we also buttress it with three extended 
case studies from mainstream companies (Yahoo, AOL and Navistar), where managerial 
overconfidence about long-term investments thrived, only to be disrupted by hedge fund 
activism.  
 
Our analytic arguments and case studies help elucidate several factors that make long-
term projects especially susceptible to overconfidence. Foremost, due to their longer 
trajectories, long-term investments are frequently volatile—they could result in either an 
extremely high upside or an extremely low downside. An optimistic manager, who 
overestimates the likelihood of achieving success, is particularly prone to miscalculating 
value in a long-term (and thus more volatile) investment.17  We argue that amplified 
managerial optimism plausibly played a role in the hiring of Marissa Mayer as Yahoo’s 
CEO. Mayer lacked relevant experience to lead a company of Yahoo’s size and had an 
inconsistent trajectory at Google (which included a recent demotion). Yahoo’s board was 
nonetheless won over by her ambitious long-term plan to make Yahoo competitive with 
Facebook and Google in a still emerging and unpredictable market.18 Yet, with variability 
that large, this Article argues, even moderate optimism on the board’s part could have led 
to a significant overestimation of Mayer’s plan for Yahoo. 
 
Our case studies also help demonstrate how other factors contributing to 
overconfidence are likely to be especially salient for long-horizon ventures. One important 
force exacerbating overconfidence—often referred to as the “illusion of control”—
manifests when there is a long temporal “onramp” to strategize, act, and overcome 
impediments.19 For example, Dan Ustian (the then-CEO of Navistar) was so committed to 
                                               
17 To illustrate, assume two similar investments, a short-term investment ST that could produce either 200 or 
320, each with 50% probability, and a long-term investment LT, that involves higher uncertainty (high upside 
and low downside) and hence could produce either 0 or 500, each with 50% probability. ST has a higher 
expected value than LT (260 relative to 250). Now assume that for each of these investments, an 
overconfident manager overestimates the probability of a good scenario to be 60%, (and accordingly 
underestimates the probability of a bad scenario to be 40%). For the overconfident manager the LT 
investment has a higher expected value than the ST investment (300 relative to 272). The overconfident 
manager thus would exhibit a long-term bias, preferring an objectively inferior LT investment to a superior 
ST one. For a broader discussion see infra Part III.A.2. 
18 Accordingly, the Yahoo board viewed the less risky plan proposed by Yahoo’s internal candidate, Ross 
Levinsohn, as short-sighted. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
19 See e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 311 (1975) (participants 
who had more time to think about actions and strategies demonstrated higher overconfidence on their chances 
to win a lottery). For a broader discussion see infra Part III.A.3. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338631  Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=33 8631 
LONG-TERM	BIAS	(BARZUZA	&	TALLEY)		
	 8	
perfecting an as-yet unproven technology for complying with new environmental standards 
that he neglected to develop a backup plan, even as his favored technology began to show 
definitive signs of falling short.20 In addition, in Mayer’s sole interview after Yahoo’s 
failure, she doubled down on her belief that the only thing that was missing was time – if 
she had a few more years, she reasoned, could have successfully righted Yahoo’s listing 
ship.21 Another factor contributing to overconfidence—the tendency to neglect potential 
downstream competition—is also especially salient with respect to long-term investments, 
as long-term competition is hard to predict when the initial project is inevitably vague.22 
Mayer’s long-term plan for Yahoo, for instance, which was focused on creating different 
apps—most notably a search app—relied on Mayer’s skills, experience, and success while 
neglecting to predict how competitive the market for apps would become.  
 
Finally, certain factors that ordinarily help restrain and/or discipline overconfident 
managers—frequent benchmarking exercises and interim feedback—are mechanically less 
routine when it comes to long-gestation projects.23 When the finish line is far off on the 
horizon, regular and probative feedback is not often easily gleaned, arrives sporadically,24 
and once it arrives the manager may already be prohibitively invested in the long-term 
project.25  When problems arose with Navistar’s ambitious Exhaust Gas Recirculation 
(EGR) technology, for example, CEO Ustian practically quarantined his office away from 
the company engineers, dismissing employees who were vocally skeptical. 26  And in 
“probably the most intense moment you'll ever hear during a workplace conference call,”27 
                                               
20 See infra Part III.C.3 
21 See e.g., Tiernan Ray, As the Yahoo! Turns: Mayer Defends Strategic Plan, M&A with Charlie Rose, 
BARRON’S (March 11, 2016), available at https://www.barrons.com/articles/as-the-yahoo-turns-mayer-
defends-strategic-plan-acquisitions-with-charlie-rose-1457714287 (“Here we are, when you look at what has 
happened, what did you do wrong? Asked Rose. Well, …I don't think the story has yet played out…A lot of 
tech turnaround adds we do take five, six, seven years.”); See also Douglas MacMillan, Marissa Mayer Wants 
Three More Years to Turn Around Yahoo, WSJ (March 11, 2016) available at 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2016/03/11/marissa-mayer-wants-three-more-years-to-turn-around-yahoo/ 
22 On the relationship of vagueness to overconfidence see infra Part III.B.1.  
23 Benchmarking to a reference class of projects is less likely for long-term projects since managers typically 
believe them to be unique. For the importance of using a reference class to restrain overconfidence see Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures.12 TIMS STUDIES IN 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 313 (1977) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction]; Daniel 
Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives’ Decisions, 81 
HARV. BUS. REV. 68 (2003) [hereinafter Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions]; Daniel Kahneman, THINKING, 
FAST AND SLOW (NEW YORK, NY: FARRAR, STRAUS, AND GIROUX 2011) [hereinafter, Kahneman, Thinking]. 
For a broader discussion of restrains to overconfidence in long-term projects see infra Part III.B. 
24 See e.g., Stephano DellaVigna & Joshua Pollet, Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings Announcements, 
64 J. FIN., 709 (2009) (finding that “shareholder attention to events far in the future is limited”). 
25  See e.g., Tali Sharot, Christoph W. Korn, & Raymond J. Dolan, R. How Unrealistic Optimism is 
Maintained in the Face of Reality, 14 NATUR. NEURO. 1475 (2011) (finding asymmetric updating of beliefs 
in light of new information); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480 (1990) 
(arguing that motivation affects reasoning). 
26 See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
27 Nicholas Carlson, LEAKED AUDIO: Listen to AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Fire A Patch Employee in Front 
Of 1,000 Coworkers, BUSINESS INSIDER (August 12, 2013) [hereinafter Carlson, Leaked Audio] available at 
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Tim Armstrong, AOL’s CEO (who eventually had to cut bait on his own long-term project 
called Patch), impulsively fired an employee in front of the entire division. In a recent 
retrospective interview, Armstrong identified his coddling of Patch as his main misstep at 
AOL, and in particular, his pattern of ignoring incoming feedback and data with respect to 
the project.28 
 
To the extent that our account of long-term managerial bias is persuasive, it holds 
several implications for corporate law and policy. First, it suggests managers are, if left to 
their own devices, inclined to overinvest in long-term projects. As a result, external short-
term pressures may have some positive ramifications.29 Activist hedge funds no doubt 
emphasize (and may overemphasize) short-term performance, resulting in excess demand 
for immediate payouts. But irrespective of motivation, such short-termism may place an 
institutional brake on at least certain forms of long-termist overinvestment.   
 
Second, short-term pressure to unlock cash may increase the frequency of external 
feedback and benchmarking for overconfident managers, since it requires them to draw 
more regularly on external sources to finance their projects. It is well known that 
overconfidence tends to feed on a surplus of internal funds (e.g., retained earnings) to 
underwrite projects.30 If overconfident managers are required to raise capital externally 
(because activists keep capital margins thin), they will have to subject their strategies more 
frequently to outside assessment.31  
                                               
http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-audio-listen-to-aol-ceo-tim-armstrong-fire-a-patch-employee-
snapping-a-photo-2013-8. 
28  See Oath CEO Tim Armstrong on Recode Media (Sep 3, 2017) 
https://www.recode.net/2017/9/3/16243970/transcript-oath-ceo-tim-armstrong-aol-patch-verizon-yahoo-
recode-media  (“The judgment changed and the mistake I made was going exactly what you said, too bullish 
down a path without making sure those early positive metrics were actually coming true in all the other 
markets.”) 
29 So far, the conventional wisdom dismissed arguments of overinvestments. Empire building, an agency-
costs theory of overinvestment, was considered dated, since compensation packages align managers 
incentives with firm value. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 8. The long-termism approach, though is 
overconfidence driven–as a result, incentive-based compensation does not solve it, quite the contrary. 
Overconfident managers who genuinely but mistakenly believe in the desirability of these investments, are 
encouraged to invest more if their compensation is tied to firm value. See e.g., Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey 
Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. OF FIN. 2661, 2697 (2005) [hereinafter 
Malmendier & Tate, Investment] (“Specifically, standard incentives such as stock- and option-based 
compensation are unlikely to mitigate the detrimental effects of managerial overconfidence.”) 
30 See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29 (finding that overconfident CEOs “overinvest when 
they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing.” And that 
this “sensitivity of investment to cash flow is strongest for CEOs of equity-dependent firms, for whom 
perceived financing constraints are most binding.”); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes 
Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. OF FIN. ECON., 20 (2008) [hereinafter 
Malmendier & Tate, Acquisitions]; (overconfident CEO are likely to make value destroying acquisitions, and 
the effect is stronger “if they have access to internal financing.“) In addition, in all the three case studies that 
this Article discusses – namely, Yahoo, AOL & Navistar – the firms were generating significant cash-flow, 
which was used to finance the long-term investments. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
31 Indeed, a recent study finds that new equity issues wash out half of firms’ payouts to shareholders. See 
Jesse Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows, 8 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 207 (2019); 




Third, our analysis bears on ongoing reform proposals to re-shape doctrines, laws and 
regulations in order to protect long-termism management from short-term demands. The 
Brokaw Act, for example, which intends to limit hedge fund activists through a variety of 
disclosure and liability measures, was reintroduced on August 31, 2017 and is currently 
percolating its way through Congress. Several opponents of hedge fund activism have also 
called for elimination of quarterly reporting requirements (generating recent presidential 
and regulatory attention). And, several recent decisions by Delaware courts have held that 
a director nominee of a short-term investor or hedge find might breach fiduciary duties by 
pursuing strategies that appear to disregard the firm’s long-term equity value. 32  Our 
analysis counsels some degree of caution in pursuing these legal and regulatory 
interventions—predicated largely on insulating corporate decision making from the forces 
short-termism alone.  If such interventions do not account for the possibility of value-
reducing long-termism too, the results could miss their mark by a wide margin.33 
 
Fourth, our analysis has implications for takeover law, such as Delaware’s well-known 
approach that permits managers to “just say no” to a hostile acquirer. As students of 
corporate law are well aware, public-company managers tend frequently to spurn outside 
acquisition offers (purportedly made by short-termist corporate raiders), asserting that the 
premium offered (frequently 30% to 50% above prevailing the market price) undershoots 
the real value of the company’s long-term prospects. Delaware courts judge such resistance 
with considerable deference, maintaining that so long as the target board’s assessment is 
genuine and informed, it enjoys wide latitude to stiff-arm an outside bid.34 If, however, 
managerial assessments of long-term value are biased, judicial deference may not always 
be categorically justified.  
 
Finally, our argument also has implications for assessing the new phenomenon of dual-
class IPOs.35 Despite a potential discount to the IPO price, overconfident managers, who 
believe that the market is likely to undervalue their long-term project, may embrace a dual-
class structure to protect their projects from subsequent shareholder revolts.36 While our 
strong intuition is to leave such capital-structure decisions up to the promoters (who must 
                                               
see also Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 8, at 1136 (arguing that in the absence of short-term 
pressures “management might refrain from taking actions that would reduce the size of the empire under its 
control or the freedom to pursue projects without the discipline generated by having to raise outside 
financing.”)  
32 See sources cited supra note 11. 
33 We note that thus far, the Delaware courts appear to be exercising this caution implicitly. In the recent 
Trados and PLX decisions, for example, Vice Chancellor Laster held that hedge-fund nominee directors 
violated their fiduciary duties by engineering an early exits, but the Court then also determined the damages 
to be effectively zero. See Trados, supra note 11, at 107-112; PLX, supra note 11, at 103; 134. 
34 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2D 1140 (1989). 
35 See discussion infra Part IV.C.1. 
36 Cf. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision and Corporate Control, 125 YALE L.J. 560 
(2016) (arguing that founders maintain control to protect their idiosyncratic vision from investors who 
mistakenly underestimate its value). 
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internalize the discount, after all), long-termism may well imply that at least some fraction 
of dual-class structures are unwise or inefficient.37 
 
We flag three important caveats to our analysis before proceeding. First, much of our 
constructive argument marshals insights and findings from behavioral finance and 
psychology, positing how certain non-rational biases may distort managerial decision 
making. We are mindful that behavioral approaches may not be appropriate in all 
circumstances, and—when used too immodestly—fall prey to the vice of explaining too 
much (providing a metaphorical Swiss-Army knife of biases that can rationalize 
anything).38 That said, behavioral arguments seem particularly apt in assessing the instant 
debate, since many (if not most) coherent criticisms of short-termism similarly must draw 
on behavioral theories, rejecting an assumption of perfectly rational capital markets. In a 
sense, then, what’s good for the activist goose is also good for the managerial gander. 
 
Second, while our focus here is on making the case that long-term bias exists and 
distorts corporate decision making, we do not aspire to displace or refute the prevailing 
narrative about the dangers of short-term bias. Quite to the contrary, a key puzzle 
surrounding short-termism—its stubborn persistence over time—becomes far less 
paradoxical when short-termism is viewed as an institutional “chaperone” to long-
termism.39 Because the two biases affect managers in opposing directions, they tend to 
counteract one another’s most glaring shortcomings. Once one relaxes utopian assumptions 
about the sacrosanctity of long-term value, persistent and durable short-termism among 
sophisticated investors becomes both more plausible and symbiotic. Viewed thusly, long-
term bias is the yin to short-termism’s yang.40 
 
Finally, even if one accepts our constructive argument, it concededly comes straight 
out of the “shareholder primacy” handbook, equating firm welfare to shareholder value. 
While this normative frame is well established in doctrine, the relative merits of long-term 
versus short-term management could easily change when reckoned against alternative 
desiderata. One important and re-emerging dialogue within corporate law concerns the 
extent to which managers do (or should) give decisional weight to a broader set of 
constituencies beyond stockholders. Creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and 
surrounding communities may also have a stake in company decisions, yet are rarely 
accorded the same primacy under corporate law that shareholders receive. And, it seems 
plausible that many overconfident long-term strategies also tend to bestow collateral 
benefits on non-shareholder constituencies (e.g., aggressive R&D programs that increase 
                                               
37 At the same time, we do not rule out that in some cases, the manager rightly believes in her long-term 
project, while investors mistakenly undervalue her unique vision. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 36.	
38 See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails,  127 HARV. L. REV. 
1593 (2014). 
39 See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-Termism and Long-Termism, Virginia Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 2; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 526 (2016), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2731814, (modeling short-termism’ interactions with long-termism). 
40 For an analysis of the relationship between biases’ costs and biases’ survivorship over time see Xavier 
Gabaix, A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1661 (2014).  
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the company’s workforce). Thus, even if our arguments are correct, long-term value 
maximization could still emerge attractive precisely because it endows managers with the 
equanimity to pursue strategies that are both overconfidently sanguine and stakeholder 
friendly. While we welcome this dialogue, we also submit that a host of alternative 
mechanisms exist for ensuring stakeholder-friendly governance, including public benefit 
corporate structures, 41  alternative financing arrangements, 42  tax incentives, 43  and top-
down regulation. 44  Some of these alternatives could well outflank managerial long-
termism in harmonizing the interests of multiple stakeholders. At the very least, these 
comparisons deserve to be made transparently, and upon equal footing.   
Our analysis unfolds as follows. Part II discusses the current debate surrounding short-
termism, along with its curious limitations. Parts III.A. & III.B. analyze the overconfidence 
literature and argue that based on experimental evidence, empirical data and theory, 
managerial overconfidence should lead to a long-term bias. Part III.C moves to discuss the 
three illustrative case studies – Yahoo, AOL & Navistar – where managers’ overly rosy 
assessments of long-term projects were arguably interrupted by activist hedge funds. Part 
IV discusses legal and business implications of our argument. Part V concludes. 
II. SHORT-TERMISM: THE STANDARD (& PARADOXICAL) ACCOUNT  
It takes little more than a glancing perusal of the popular business press to confirm that 
short-termism has become a defining cause célèbre of corporate America.45 According to 
the conventional account that has prevailed since the Financial Crisis, 46 managers of public 
companies face constant pressures—most notably from hedge fund activists—to meet 
quarterly earnings, enhance liquidity, and pay out immediate returns, even if doing so 
sacrifices superior long-term investments and growth.47 By appearance, such charges have 
                                               
41 See Jesse Finfrock & Eric L. Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1867 (2014). 
42 See generally HANDBOOK OF GREEN FINANCE (Sachs et al. eds) (Springer 2019). 
43 See, e.g., Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang & Jin Wang, Employee Treatment and Firm Leverage: A Test of 
The Stakeholder Theory of Capital Structure, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 130 (2011) (finding a systematic relationship 
between corporate leverage and employee satisfaction, and positing that tax incentives that favor high 
leverage ratios may impair employee welfare). 
44 See, e.g., Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act (S. 3348, 2018), which would federalize 
all US corporations with over $1 billion or more of annual revenue, and mandate that not less than 40% of 
the directors of a United States corporation be elected by employees, requiring directors to consider the 
interests of all corporate stakeholders; and Chuck Schumer’s and Bernie Sanders’ recent proposal to prohibit 
share buybacks and dividends unless a corporations satisfied minimal employee wage and benefit 
requirements. Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders, “Limit Corporate Stock Buybacks”, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Feb. 3, 2019). 
45 See sources cited supra note 9.  
46 As noted above, the popular business press has lamented short termism since at least the early 1980s, then 
usually in the guise of leveraged buyouts and corporate raiders. See note 1 supra.  Here we confine description 
to the most recent incarnation. 
47 See e.g., The Conference Board, Is Short-Term Behavior Jeopardizing the Future Prosperity of Business? 
(2015) available at 
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/IsShortTermBehaviorJeopardizingTheFutureProsperityOfBusiness_CEOStrateg
icImplications.pdf. 
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some merit: As is well known, activists often pressure firms to increase dividend 
distribution and share repurchases, cut investments, and promote spinoffs and sales. 
Shortly after executing such strategies, moreover, activists frequently unwind their 
positions, – leaving other shareholders behind to bear the long-term costs that their 
purportedly myopic strategies have wrought. Augmenting and backstopping activists’ 
incentives, the argument goes, is hard economics: The standard hedge fund manager’s 
compensation structure – 2% on assets, but a staggering 20% on appreciation of their 
portfolio – provides a substantial reward for hitting a short-term home run, even as it 
eschews the less sexy (if still profitable) path of steady growth.48 In addition, hedge funds 
investors typically are able to pull their money out of the fund within six months to two 
years, and they are known to threaten to do so whenever the fund manager cannot 
demonstrate short-term performance and gains.49 Accordingly, several studies have shown 
that hedge funds can (and do) face significant liquidity crises through investor demands.50 
The resulting landscape overdetermines short-term bias, the argument goes, resulting in 
significant damage that includes a documented decline in firms’ R&D investments and 
capital expenditures due to activist pressures.51 Furthermore, the deleterious effects of 
activism reach far beyond the specific firms targeted – they easily “go viral” as other 
managers grope to implement short-termist strategies themselves, desperately hoping to 
deter activism within their own ranks.52 Adding to the pressure from activists, quarterly 
reporting requirements cast a frequent, mandatory, and often unflattering spotlight on 
short-term performance. 53  Management surveys confirm that perceived short-term 
pressures such as those described above have a significant limiting effect on long-term 
investments.54  
 
The concern that short-term bias limits long-term investment and growth has become 
widespread, significant, and highly influential. Judges, policy makers, investors, lawyers, 
and managers, all share this concern and a sense of urgency to act to limit short-termism. 
Judge Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has warned in 2010 that 
“there is a danger that activist stockholders will make proposals motivated by interests 
other than maximizing the long-term, sustainable profitability of the corporation.”55 More 
                                               
48 See e.g., Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 3, at 1894-1895.   
49 See Strine, id., at 1893-1894 (“A useful contrast is private equity’s typical five- to ten-year lock-up); Coffee 
& Palia, supra note 8, at 573. 
50 See e.g., Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni & Rabih Moussawi, Hedge Fund Stock Trading during 
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 (2012) [hereinafter, Ben-David et al., Financial 
Crisis] (finding that “following poor past performance, hedge fund investors withdraw almost three times 
more capital than do mutual fund investors”) . 
51 See e.g. Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 576 (surveying studies that find that hedge fund activism is 
associated with a decline in R&D investment); But see Brav et al., Innovation, supra note 10 (finding that 
target firms decrease investment in R&D but improve innovation output measured in patent counts and 
citations); Brav et al., Real Effects, supra note 10 (finding that target firms improve operational and allocative 
efficiency). 
52 See Gantchev et al., supra note 10. 
53 See e.g., Lipton, New Paradigm, supra note 11. 
54 See Campbell et al., Financial Reporting, supra note 10; Barton et al., supra note 10. 
55 See Strine, Fundamental Question, supra note 3, at 8. 
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recently, Strine reiterated that “…changes in corporate behavior influenced by stock 
market forces such as hedge fund activism: a short-term increase in productivity and stock 
price at the expense of long-term reinvestment and wage growth, will likely harm the 
overall ‘portfolio’ of the human investor.”56 Larry Fink, Chair and CEO of Blackrock—a 
significant investment fund—similarly stated that “[t]he effects of the short-termism 
phenomenon are troubling...more and more corporate leaders have responded with actions 
that can deliver immediate returns to shareholders, such as buybacks or dividend increases, 
while underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures 
necessary to sustain long-term growth.”57 
 
Similarly, the preeminent corporate lawyer Martin Lipton has been notably vocal 
about the risks of short-termism. In a recent publication Lipton argued that “This pervasive 
short-termism is eroding the overall economy and putting our nation at a major competitive 
disadvantage.”58 Lipton has harsh words for activists’ “misuse of shareholder power,”59 
which ”can only be considered a form of extortion”60 Similarly, the Conference Board, a 
leading business research organization, has warned about the risks of short-termism in a 
publication titled “Is Short-Term Behavior Jeopardizing the Future Prosperity of 
Business?”61  
 
Amid this choir of prominent critics, a dissonant counter-melody has also emerged.  
Several commentators (including both academics and hedge funds) openly question the 
magnitude (and direction) of the short-termism concerns along multiple fronts.62 Some 
have argued, for example, that complaints about short-term bias are little more than a 
smoke screen for agency costs. According to this argument, managerial empire building, 
inattentiveness, and internal diversification (all contrary to the interests of shareholders) 
may lead managers to keep their organizations too large, too diversified and unnecessarily 
illiquid.63 Moreover, several empirical studies have shown that activist interventions are 
associated with positive and significant market response in stock prices of around 5% on 
average. 64  Such announcement returns would be consistent with long-term value 
destruction only if capital markets made significant and systematic errors in pricing 
                                               
56 Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 3, at 1885  
57  Larry Fink, Chair and CEO of Blackrock, Letter To CEOs (March 31, 2015) available at 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library /20150331 BlackRock.pdf . 
58 See Lipton, Some Thoughts 2017, supra note 5. 
59 Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. 
SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Februry 23, 2013), available at 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/ 26/ bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-
the-economy. 
60 See Lipton, Important Questions, supra note 4. 
61 The Conference Board, supra note 47.  
62  See e.g., Steve N. Kaplan, Are U.S. Companies Too Short-Term Oriented? Some Thoughts, NBER 
WORKING PAPER NO. W23464 (2017) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2980552 (despite ongoing short-termism concerns 
“corporate profits are near all-time highs”). 
63 See e.g., Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 8. 
64 See Brav et al, Firms Performance, supra note 14. 
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securities, disregarding longer term implications (a possibility that some entertain, at least 
episodically65). In addition, the average holding period for hedge fund activists appears to 
be close to two years (during which they often have board representation66), seemingly at 
odds with the “quick round trip” narrative the conventional theory offers.67 And, most 
modern activism appears intimately related to playing an ongoing role in governance 
through board seats, a phenomenon historically associated with “long-term” activism.68  
 
The battle lines around activism and short-termism are now ell established, and they 
have remained approximately stationary for roughly a decade. By our lights, the skirmish 
has devolved into something of a Remarquian standoff. 69 The lack of a definitive victor, 
however, has not diluted the impression among many prominent commentators that short-
termism remains pervasive and threatening. Indeed, such concerns have become 
sufficiently influential that numerous reforms to discourage short-termism in order to 
protect and vindicate long term value are currently on the table. The proposed Brokaw Act 
would “fight against increasing short-termism in our economy by promoting transparency 
and strengthening oversight of activist hedge funds.”70  Similarly, within securities law 
                                               
65 See Roe, supra note 6.  
66  See Ian D. Gow Sa-Pyung Sean Shin Suraj Srinivasan, Activist Directors: Determinants and 
Consequences, Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-120, June 2014 
67 See Brav et al, Firms Performance, supra note 14. 
68 In 2016, for example, activists participated in 110 proxy fights, winning 145 board seats.  See Lazard’s 
2017 Activism Year in Review, available at https://www.lazard.com/media/450414/lazards-review-of-
shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf. The vast majority of these seats were won through settlements with 
the targeted board. Their terms rarely contain explicit requirements to distribute capital, pay dividends, sell 
the company, replace the CEO, or any other specific demand that is typically attributed to hedge fund 
activism. See Alon Brav, Lucian Bebchuk, Wei Jiang, & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with the Activists, Harvard 
Law School Olin Discussion Paper No. 906, May 2017; John C. Coffee, Robert J. Jackson, Joshua Mitts 
& Robert Bishop, Activists Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an activist Director Goes on 
the Board, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-15 (2018).  
The Yahoo settlement, for example, required establishment of strategic committee. See Yahoo Inc! 
Form 8-K, Exhibit 10.1 (April 26, 2016) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312516558861/d185516dex101.htm; 
Furthermore, activists’ fillings frequently. In the Darden/Olive Garden proxy fight, activist investor 
Starboard Value prepared a long and detailed report about the long table wait at restaurants and other 
suggested improvements. See Transforming, Darden Restaurant, Starboard Value (September 11, 2014) 
available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/940944/000092189514002031/ex991dfan14a06297125_091114.
pdf. Similarly the recent campaign of Nelson Peltz for Proctor & Gamble included significant proposals for 
operational improvement. See The Proctor & Gamble Company, Schedule 14A (August 16, 2017) available 
at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/80424/000090266417003355/p17-1738dfrn14a.htm. Thus, the 
skeptics have rejoined, while there is no doubt that hedge fund intervention frequently is geared around 
extracting short-term value, examples about where such interventions were also directed at improving the 
firm long-term strategy, operational changes, and managerial advice. See Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 3 
(“here is some emerging evidence suggesting that activist hedge funds prepared to take a long-term position 
and work as fiduciaries to improve the performance of the companies they target achieve a better market 
reaction.”); See also C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of 
Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016). 
69 See Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (Ballantine 1928). 
70 See U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin, supra note 11; See also Brokaw Act, supra note 11. 
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there has been a growing movement afoot in recent years to relax and/or eliminate other 
potential sources of mandatory short-term benchmarking, such as the half-century-old 
requirement71 of quarterly financial reporting.72 These calls eventually spurred President 
Trump to order (well, to Tweet, actually73) that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) investigate whether it should revert to semi-annual or annual reporting instead.74 
And in late 2018 the SEC obliged, issuing a notice for public comment on the question of 
whether the “existing periodic reporting system . . . foster[s] an inefficient outlook among 
registrants and market participants by focusing on short-term results. . . .” 75  
 
But perhaps the most salient move for students of corporate law has occurred in the 
courts, which have themselves begun to redefine directors’ fiduciary duties to align with a 
long-termist brand of shareholder maximization. 76  Consider, for example, the 2013 
Delaware case involving the acquisition of Trados Inc., 77  a venture-capital-backed 
software start-up that had performed well enough to stay alive, but not well enough to meet 
expectations of the venture capital funds underwriting it. When a buyer emerged willing to 
acquire the company for (approximately) the value of the VCs’ liquidation claim (via their 
preferred shares), an inter-shareholder Battle Royale ensued where preferred shareholders 
wished to cash out immediately while common shareholders – who would receive no 
consideration for the transaction – wished to maintain the status quo. The preferreds (who 
held the majority of voting power and director seats) managed to cram down the deal, and 
former common shareholders sued, claiming that the preferreds’ board nominees abrogated 
their fiduciary duties by failing to accord sufficient weight to the interests of the common, 
who were “permanent capital” at the firm.  
 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s well-cited 2013 trial opinion established a template that 
would be followed many times thereafter. In it, Laster held that the rigorous entire fairness 
standard of review would apply to the board’s process and decision to favor one group of 
shareholders over another. Applying this standard, the Vice Chancellor found that the 
board failed to demonstrate procedural fairness, since their deliberations never seriously 
                                               
71 See Proposal to Adopt Form 10-Q Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and to Rescind Forms 8-K and 9-K under that Act, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-8683 
(Sept. 15, 1969); Adoption of Form 10-Q, Rescission of Form 9-K and Amendment of Rules 13a- 13 and 
15d-13, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9004 (Oct. 28, 1970). 
72  See e.g., Lipton, New Paradigm, supra note 11 (calling for elimination of quarterly reporting 
requirements); see also Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 3, at 1956-1969 (proposing an array of policy 
responses, i.e., curbing shareholder proposals mechanism.) 
73 See https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1030416679069777921. 
74 See e.g., Dave Michaels, et al., Trump Asks SEC to Ease Earnings Reporting, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 18, 
2018, at A1. 
75 See Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, 33-10588, 34- 84842 (Dec. 18, 
2018) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/33-10588.pdf). 
76 See Trados, supra note 11, at 34 (DEL. CH. 2013) (“the duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors 
maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term “); In Re Rural/Metro Corporation S’Holders Litig., 
102 A.3D 205, 253 (DEL. CH. 2014); Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 11,  at 49. (“the directors’ fiduciary 
duties … require that they maximize the value of the corporation over the long term.”) 
77 Trados, supra note 11. 
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gave due weight to the welfare of the common shareholders in negotiating the acquisition. 
At the same time, however, Laster substantially defanged the unfair process finding, 
holding that the fair price for common shareholders was zero.78 While one could certainly 
quibble with the finding that the common stock (which effectively represented an “at the 
money call option” on the firm) had no economic value whatsoever, the more durable effect 
of Trados is that it established a template for adjudicating fiduciary duty cases where 
different classes are pitted against one another. In such situations, the long-term position 
represented by “permanent capital” (usually the common shareholders) gets a decided 
thumb on the scale. 
 
 Vice Chancellor Laster doubled down on this view in the 2017 opinion in Hsu v. 
ODN Holding Corp.79 This case was substantially similar Trados (pitting short-termist 
preferreds who favored exit against common who favored the status quo), but here the 
preferred shareholders induced the board to allow them to utilize a redemption right that 
effectively forced an exit.  In denying a motion to dismiss, the Vice Chancellor once again 
explicitly prioritized long-term investors (conceived as common shareholders) in 
fiduciary-duty space as the holders of permanent capital. Recognizing the difficulty in 
applying shareholder primacy when there are multiple forms of equity, Laster once again 
deferred to common stockholders, writing: 
 
In a world with many types of stock— preferred stock, tracking stock, … plain vanilla common 
stock, etc.….the question naturally arises: which stockholders?... Equity capital, by default, is 
permanent capital. In terms of the standard, of conduct, therefore, the fiduciary relationship requires 
that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation 
over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital, as 
warranted for an entity with a presumptively perpetual life in which the residual claimants have 
locked in their investment….[I]t generally ‘will be the duty of the board, where discretionary 
judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock—as the good faith judgment of 
the board sees them to be—to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of 
preferred stock.’ 80 
 
 The long-termist view of fiduciary duties (identified with the interests of common 
shareholders) has emerged many times since, most recently in the 2018 case of In Re PLX 
                                               
78 Specifically, Laster’s opinion states: 
 
I believe that Trados would not be able to grow at a rate that would yield value for the common. Trados likely 
could self-fund, avoid bankruptcy, and continue operating, but it did not have a realistic chance of generating 
a sufficient return to escape the gravitational pull of the large liquidation preference and cumulative dividend.... 
In light of this reality, the directors breached no duty to the common stock by agreeing to a Merger in which 
the common stock received nothing. The common stock had no economic value before the Merger, and the 
common stock- holders received in the Merger the substantial equivalent in value of what they had before. 
 
Trados, supra note 11, at 110-11. 
79 Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding Corp., No. CV 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at 17 (Del. 
Ch. April 14, 2017), as corrected (April 24, 2017). 
80 ODN, supra at pp 35-36, 40-41 (external citation omitted). 
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Stockholder Litigation,81 which involved a shareholder challenge to the sale of PLX (a 
semiconductor producer) in a strategic transaction with Avago. The plaintiffs claimed that 
the transaction was the result of a secret plan by an activist hedge fund (Potomac) and its 
manager (Singer), wanting to make a quick profit on an investment in the company. (Singer 
was already a PLX director, having gained a board seat through a successful proxy contest.) 
The plaintiffs claimed that Singer had secretly conspired to reach a sale price with an 
unannounced bidder (Avago), going so far as to work with an investment bank to engineer 
discounted-cash-flow valuations justifying the agreed upon price. In evaluating the 
proposal once it was finally made, the board had no knowledge of Singer’s prior 
involvement and only limited access to the massaged valuation metrics. A majority of 
shareholders approved the transaction, also unaware of Singer’s dealings. 
 
 After several defendants either settled or were dismissed out, the key surviving 
issue in the case concerned the plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting claim against Singer and 
Potomac.  Much of the Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion concentrates on a predicate 
element of the aiding-and-abetting claim: the underlying breach of fiduciary duty by the 
board.  Having first held that the shareholder vote approving the deal had no “cleansing” 
effect because of several material non-disclosures about Singer’s prior secret dealings, the 
court found a breach of fiduciary duty that turned critically on short-termist motives: 
 
The record in this case convinces me that Singer and Potomac had a divergent interest in achieving 
quick profits by orchestrating a near-term sale at PLX. During their activist campaign and 
subsequent proxy contest, Singer and Potomac argued vehemently that PLX should be sold quickly. 
Singer’s thesis for investing in PLX depended entirely on a short-term sale to the other bidder who 
emerged during the go-shop period for the IDT. transaction. He never prepared any valuation or 
other analysis of the fundamental value of PLX. He lacked any ideas for generating value at PLX 
other than to sell it.…. Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that Potomac and Singer 
undermined the Board’s process and led the Board into a deal that it otherwise would not have 
approved….[B]y withholding this information from the rest of the Board, Singer breached his 
fiduciary duty and induced the other directors to breach theirs. 82  
 
Interestingly, and similar to Trados, Vice Chancellor Laster proceeded to defang much of 
the foregoing analysis by holding the overall deal price constituted a “fair” value of the 
company. As in Trados this final move seems somewhat curious, as it involves a “quasi-
appraisal” approach to damages rather than a “rescissory” approach, which often would 
follow a successful claim by a plaintiff that a sale would/should never have taken place. 
Thus, the opinion ups the ante even further on characterizing short-termist behavior as 
inconsistent with fiduciary duties, even as it largely nullifies the consequences of such a 
finding through its finding as to remedy. 
 
  From the brief review above, it seems clear that the Delaware courts have begun 
to migrate towards a clear recognition of long-term equity value as the sine qua non of 
fiduciary duties. They have thus far done so, however, with a decidedly light touch, 
                                               
81  See In Re PLX Stockholder Litigation. C.A. No. 9880-VCL, (October 16, 2019) (available at 
https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=279880). 
82 In Re PLX at 103-115. 
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fashioning creative doctrinal analyses and/or remedies that dampen the most severe 
consequences of a breach through short-term-oriented decisions. One reading of this move 
is that it constitutes a jurisprudential “beta test” of a novel doctrinal innovation. Even so, 
these recent doctrinal events represent a clear early signal that the debate over short-
termism—while still arguably locked in a stalemate among many academics—has begun 
to move the judicial needle in important ways. 
 
It is unlikely that any single article (including ours) can definitively resolve the debate 
over short-termism. Nevertheless, we aspire to help reassess it, motivated by two aspects 
about the debate that we find paradoxical. First, conventional wisdom on both sides seems 
to presuppose the sacrosanctity of unalloyed long-term value maximization. That is, the 
goal of long-term value is unassailable and uncontroversial (even as the combatants bicker 
about whether short term pressures preempt or catalyze it). Throughout, however, and in 
sharp contrast to the short-term bias debate, long-term value has remained the darling of 
nearly all sides of the debate in corporate practice and policy, frequently equated with 
efficiency, optimality and growth. But is it always true that long-termism could never be 
excessive, or biased, or skewed? Has this assumption even been tested or thought through 
carefully? Are there no reasons why managers might prefer inferior long-term investments 
over superior short-term gains? In our view, the received debate pays little to no attention 
to this question. 
 
Second, assuming arguendo that activists fall prey continually and perpetually to 
short-term biases, then it must be the case that they leave significant value on the table. 
Why they would do so is a mystery. Why would sophisticated and financially motivated 
hedge-fund managers operating in a decidedly competitive market chase only limited short-
term gains, if (through a modicum of patience) they could derive substantially higher 
returns by waiting?83 And why would they continue to do so for over a decade, across both 
economic booms and busts? Activists have it within their power to correct their own biases, 
by (for instance) choosing a compensation structure that offers lower rewards for short-
term performance. Strikingly, however, not only have hedge funds not moved in this 
direction, but they are now doing the opposite –shifting from the common 2 and 20, to 1 
and 20–rewarding fund managers even less on assets, and relatively more on short-term 
appreciation. 84  To be sure, long term compensation would not necessarily alleviate 
pressure short-termist pressure from hedge-fund investors, who often redeem their 
investment if short-term performance is weak.85 (Indeed, hedge funds suffered high rates 
of liquidation during the last financial crisis.86) But here still, many investors are also 
sophisticated and should be sensitive to long-term value; it seems curious that funds would 
not develop tools to commit to long-term gains, or signal the value of long-term investment 
                                               
83 See Roe, supra note 6. 
84 See Lindsay Fortado, Hedge Fund Investors Question ‘2 and 20’ Fees, Fund Managers Criticized for 
Focusing on Management Rather than Performance Fees, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 6, 2017). 
https://www.ft.com/content/291081ba-49df-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43 
85 See e.g., Strine, Who Bleeds, supra note 3. 
86 See Ben-David et al., Financial Crisis, supra note 50. 
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to their investors.87 All told, even if short termism could erupt episodically, why should it 
persist for so long in capital markets, among supposedly sophisticated professionals, and 
across economic booms and busts alike?  
 
As the following parts will argue, these two puzzles (and their possible resolution) 
may well be intertwined. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we will advance the thesis 
that long-termism need not be perfect. Rather, similar to short-term bias, managing for the 
long term may sometimes exhibit its own biases. Long-term projects, we argue below, are 
especially susceptible to managerial overconfidence, and as a result, systematic 
overestimation. Since managers disproportionally overestimate the expected value of their 
long-term projects, they skew their own decisions away from objectively superior short-
term investments. And when such a phenomenon holds, short-termism is not only 
plausible, but it can become an indispensable chaperone to long-termism, effectively 
negating its most deleterious effects and explaining the forgoing puzzles with new-found 
parsimony.  
III. A NEW APPROACH: THE OVERLOOKED LONG-TERM BIAS 
This Part challenges the assumption that long-termism is essentially bias free. Rather, 
it will argue that similar to short-term bias, long-term frames can and have catalyzed a 
different type of bias in managers’ decisions.  Long-term projects, we will argue, are prone 
to overconfidence bias, and in turn to overestimation by managers. And, since managers 
systematically overestimate the value of their own long-term projects, they will tend to 
prefer them to at least some short-term projects that have superior returns. We refer to this 
phenomenon as long-term bias. The definition of long-term bias, thus, is the mirror image 
to that of short-term bias: 
 
Table 1: Definitions 
 
Long-Term Bias  A preference for a long-term investment over a superior short-term investment/return. 
Short-Term Bias A preference for a short-term investment/gain over a superior long-term investment/return. 
 
The intuition for long-term bias is straight-forward; managers tend naturally to be 
enamored with their projects as a whole, resulting in a skew that leans (over time) towards 
their long-term projects. This is only the starting point for our analysis, however. Relying 
on evidence and theory from overconfidence bias literature in general, and managerial 
                                               
87 See Roe, supra note 6, at 987-989; But see Jeremy C. Stein, Why Are Most Funds Open-End? Competition 
and the Limits of Arbitrage, 120 Q. J. OF ECON. 247 (2005) (showing how, under asymmetric information, 
fund managers signal their quality to investors by keeping their funds open for withdrawal); Andrei Shleifer 
& Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997) (showing how fund managers might skip 
profitable long-term investments to demonstrate short-success to their investors). 
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overconfidence bias in particular, Part A argues that long-term investments are prone to 
overestimation as they typically involve high uncertainty, high illusion of control, weak 
accountability and remote feedback. Then, as Part B shows, natural constraints on 
overconfidence (and debiasing over time) are likely to be especially limited when it comes 
to long-term projects, resulting in systematic long-term bias. In Part C, we make use of 
case studies to illustrate how long-term bias has manifested in managerial decisions 
involving three well-known companies. 
A. Long-Term Investments: Magnified and Influential Overconfidence 
 
Drawing on an extensive literature in psychology and behavioral finance, this part will 
show that several factors have been identified as contributing to managerial overconfidence 
– such as, high upside, vagueness, illusion of control, excessive reliance on one’s own 
skills, competition neglect, commitment to the project and dismissal of incoming feedback 
and data. Moreover, we argue, each is more salient with respect to long-term projects. As 
a result, overconfidence is especially high, influential, and resilient with respect to long-
term projects.  
1. Managerial Overconfidence – Overestimating Probabilities of Success 
 
Overconfidence, sometimes known as the “Lake Wobegon” effect, has been 
documented extensively. Most people rank themselves above average in a range of skills 
and circumstances, including driving skills, likelihood to remain healthy and stay 
married.88 More than 90% of people, in fact, rank themselves above average in driving 
skills;89 70% of high school students ranked themselves above average in leadership skills; 
and 94% of college professors rated their work to be above average.90  
 
But what about corporate managers? One might think that a competitive business 
environment might restrain overconfidence, making executives more realistic. Yet, in a 
range of studies - including experiments, surveys and data analyses - managers 
demonstrated an exceptionally prodigious “better than average effect”. 91  Indeed, 
                                               
88 See e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
806 (1980) (Finding above average effect with respect to both positive and negative events including one’s 
health, longevity, employment and marriage); Baker, L.A. & Emery, R.E. When Every Relationship is Above 
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 439 
(1993); Calderon, T.G. Predictive Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts of Corporate Earnings. THE MID-
ATLANTIC J. BUS. 29, 41 (1993); Puri, M. & Robinson, D.T. Optimism and Economic Choice. 86 J. FIN. 
ECON. 71 (2007); David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic 
Optimism, HEUR. & BIAS.: PSYCH. OF INTUIT. JUDG. 334 (eds. Gilovich, T., Griffin, D.W. & Daniel 
Kahneman, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002) [hereinafter, Armor & Taylor, Predictions Fail]. 
89 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than our Fellow Drivers? 47 ACTA PSYCH. 143 
(1981) 
90 Patricia K. Cross, Not Can but Will College Teaching be Improved? 17 NEW DIR. IN HIG. EDU. 1 (1977). 
91  See e.g., Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in 
Organizational Planning, 62 J. OF APP. PSYCH. 94 (1977) (MBA students and corporate presidents exhibited 
better than average effects, both for their skills and for their company’s predicted growth rates); J. B. Kidd 
& J. R. Morgan, A Predictive Information System for Management, 20 OPER. RES. QUART. 149 (1969) 
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executives are highly optimistic with respect to the likelihood of their projects’ success. 
For example, while a majority of US startups do not survive for more than a few years, the 
vast majority of US entrepreneurs (80%) estimated that their business would survive for 
more than 5 years.92 Rather than accepting risk estimates as given, executives typically 
believe that with the right efforts and planning they can significantly improve the odds of 
success.93 And, they exhibit this proclivity even with respect to pure chances events.94 
 
It is almost certainly the case that some degree of optimism is a de facto job 
requirement for managers and entrepreneurs whose job description, after all, requires them 
to overcome their own risk aversion and analysis paralysis. Nevertheless, there can be too 
much of a good thing, and recent literature in finance finds overconfidence to be correlated 
with financial losses and investment distortions. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, 
who pioneered much of this research, developed measures for CEO’s overconfidence 
levels, testing its effects on firms’ investments and acquisitions. 95  As proxies for 
overconfidence Malmendier and Tate adopted two main measures–press mentions of the 
CEO as confident, and the extent to which the CEO holds on to options and stock of the 
company, rather than selling. Presumably, risk-averse CEOs, who are highly invested in 
their company (their future, trajectory and compensation are all affected by the firm’s 
success), should diversify the equity compensation they receive as soon as their contract 
allows. If, however, the CEO believes that investors underestimate the value of her 
company, she might hold on to her options and stock despite the associated diversification 
costs.96 The number of confidence related mentions in the press, and the CEOs’ inclination 
to keep stock and options long after they can sell them, were used as measures for 
overconfidence. Malmendier & Tate found that overconfident CEOs “overpay for target 
                                               
(finding that managers predict better performance to their operations than the one they eventually achieved); 
Harvey Campbell, John Graham & Manju Puri, Managerial Attitudes and Corporate Actions, 109 J. OF FIN. 
ECON. 103 (2013) [Hereinafter, Campbell et al., Managerial Attitudes] (CEOs gained an average optimism 
score of 20.34 relative to 14.33-15.15 in the general population). James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial 
Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, l404 (1987) (Reprinted in J. March (Ed.). 
Decisions and Organizations, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988). Executives also exhibit another form of 
overconfidence, an “over preciseness” effects, that is, overestimation of the accuracy of their predictions. See 
e.g., Itzhak Ben-David, John Graham & Cam Harvey, Managerial Miscalibration,128 Q. J. ECON. 1547 
(2013) (finding miscalibration among CFOs) [hereinafter, Ben-David et al., Miscalibration] 
92  See Arnold C. Cooper, Carolyn Y. Woo and William C. Dunkelberg, Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances 
for Success, 3(2) J. OF BUS. VENT. 97 (1988). 
93 March & Shapira, supra note 91.  
94  Id.; see also Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I win, Tails it's chance: The Illusion of Control as a 
Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J. OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 951 (1975). 
95 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29; Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate Does Overconfidence 
Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited 11 EUROP. FIN. MANAG., 649 (2005) 
[hereinafter Malmendier & Tate, Measures Revisited].  
96 Id.  
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companies and undertake value-destroying mergers.” 97  Interestingly, they also found 
evidence for personal loss for these executives from their overconfidence. 98  
 
Significantly, overconfident CEOs tend to pose the largest danger when they have lots 
of “house money” to work with in the form of cash-flow available to them from within the 
firm. Overconfident CEOs use such internal cash flows to pursue large investments. 
However, since they overestimate their projects’ actuarial prospects, they also believe that 
their firm stock price is too low; and accordingly, if they had to raise external funds from 
investors to finance their ideas, they become more reluctant to invest.99 One influential 
study found that independent directors that were mandated by the exchanges’ listing 
standards played an important role in restraining overconfident managers, and mitigating 
overconfidence costs. 100  For firms with overconfident managers, adding independent 
directors to the board, even if only to comply with the then-newly-enacted listing standards, 
resulted in lower investments and higher profitability. 101 
2. Long-Term Projects: Little Optimism is Sufficient for High Overestimation  
 
The previous subsection surveyed evidence showing that managers frequently 
overestimate the probability of their projects to succeed. That is, they are optimistic in 
general. But such an argument is not enough by itself to establish a long-term bias. Below, 
we show several ways that managerial optimism is likely to be especially distortive in 
assessing long-term investments. That is, for long-term projects, even a moderate level of 
optimism bias could result in a far larger overestimation of the project’s expected value, 
relative to its objective, expected value.  
 
One key reason optimism disproportionally affects long-term is that optimism has 
greater distortive effect as the volatility of the project’s potential outcomes increases. Long-
term projects must be “in the oven” for extended periods, during which risk and uncertainty 
continue to percolate. Consequently, long-term projects frequently involve higher overall 
volatility. A ten-year project outcome could vary considerably depending on different 
factors at play. Thus, for long-term projects, both the potential upside and downside are 
relatively large. As illustrated below, however, since overconfident managers overestimate 
upside prospects, the large upside associated with more volatile long-term projects result 
in larger distortion.  
 
                                               
97 See Malmendier & Tate, Acquisitions, supra note 30 (overconfident CEO were more than 1.5 times more 
likely to acquire other companies, and their acquisitions triggered significant negative market response). 
98 Id., at 653 (“Indeed, it appears that CEOs who hold all the way to expiration would have been better off 
on average by exercising (1, 2, 3, or 4 years) earlier and simply investing the proceeds in the S&P 500.“) 
99 J. B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MANAG. 33 (2002). 
100 Suman Banerjee, Mark Humphery-Jenner & Vikram Nanda, Restraining Overconfident CEOs through 
Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 28 REV. OF FIN. STUD., 2812 (2015) 
[hereinafter, Banerjee et al., Overconfidence & SOX]. 
101 Id. (finding that in firms that added independent directors to comply with the mandate, “overconfident 
CEOs reduce investment and risk exposure, increase dividends, improve post-acquisition performance, and 
have better operating performance and market value.”) 
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To illustrate, consider two hypothetical investments a firm might undertake, a long-
term investment LT and a short-term investment ST. Assume that both investments involve 
some uncertainty, in particular there are two potential outcomes, with equal probabilities, 
to each investment. Assume also that both investments involve some risk; in particular, 
there are two potential outcomes, with equal probabilities, to each investment. As depicted 
in Table 1, ST could produce a payoff of either 200 or 320, each with 50% probability, and 
thus has an expected value of 260. LT produces either 0 or 500, each with 50% probability. 
102 Thus, investing in LT involves higher volatility of outcomes (higher range between 
potential outcomes) than ST, but a lower expected value (250 relative to 260).  
 
A manager who makes decisions according to objective, unbiased expected value 
assessments would obviously choose to pursue Investment ST, as it involves higher 
expected returns with lower risk.103 But an overconfident manager may not.  To see why, 
suppose that the manager is overconfident about her abilities, in that she believes that for 
either investment, the probability of the good outcome to occur is 60% rather than 50%, 
and accordingly the probability of the bad outcome to occur is only 40%. 104 As Table 2 
shows, exhibiting overconfidence toward both investments results in a stark reversal in the 
rank of investment ST relative to LT: with optimistic probabilities, the expected value of 
investment LT seems higher than the expected value of investment ST (300 relative to 
272). While an optimistic manager overestimates the probability of a good scenario for 
both investments, she overestimates the expected value of investment ST by less. The 
manager’s optimism is thus amplified by the volatility of the long-term investment. 105 
Consequently, overconfident managers might be drawn to long-term projects because of 
the high upside that they offer. Indeed, overconfident managers—measured using options-
                                               
102 To be sure, overconfidence also leads managers to underestimate volatility, especially with respect to 
long-term assessments. Yet, due to the significantly higher objective volatility of long-term projects, 
managers assign a higher volatility to long-term project than to short term ones. See Ben-David et al, 
Miscalibration, supra note 91. 
103 For purposes if illustration, assume that all risk is diversifiable so that volatility does not matter. To be 
sure, if risk is not diversifiable, risk aversion could make the LT investment less desirable for the manager. 
Yet, managers display a significantly high tolerance for risk. See e.g., Campbell et al., Managerial Attitudes, 
supra note  91 (Finding that only 9.8% of CEOs displayed low risk tolerance relative to 64% in the general 
population); Po-Hsin Ho, Chia-Wei Huang, Chih-Yung Lin & Ju-Fang Yen, CEO Overconfidence and 
Financial Crisis: Evidence from Bank Lending and Leverage,.120 J. OF FIN. ECON. 194 (2015) (finding that 
banks with overconfident CEOs were more aggressive in lending during the recent financial crisis. 
Overconfident banks issued more loans, increased their leverage more, experienced higher rates of loans 
defaults and greater drops in market value).  
104 For a formal modeling of managerial optimism as reflected in optimistic probability see Heaton, supra 
note 99. 
105 To be sure, if managers dislike losing,  loss aversion could increase their preference for the ST low 
volatility investments. Yet, as shown in Part II.B.3 managers significantly underestimate the probability of 
failure, believing that they have a control on it, and can bring it close to zero, which practically eliminates, 
in their mind, their risk of losing. See also March & Shapira, supra note 91; Christoph Schneider & Oliver 
Spalt, Conglomerate Investment, Skewness, and the CEO Long Shot Bias, 71 J. OF FIN., 635 (2016) (finding 
that in allocating capital within conglomerates, managers allocated disproportionally large capital to 
investments with high positive skewness, that is, investments with only low probability of high payoffs); See 
also Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 252  (“optimistic bias is a significant source of risk taking”) . 
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based proxies, and the character of descriptions of the CEO in the press—invest 
disproportionally in R&D, where payoffs are inherently quite uncertain.106 
 
Table 2: Long-Term, Volatility and Overconfidence 
 
Note that the bias towards long-term investments in this example does not rely on an 
assumption that managers are more optimistic for long-term investments. Rather, the 
analysis assumed the same probabilistic degree of overconfidence toward both 
investments. In particular, these examples assumed that both for LT and for ST investments 
an optimistic manager will place a probability of 60% on the good scenario instead of 50%. 
As we show in following subsection, the example above may even be a “best case” scenario 
where long-termism emerges. That is, in many realistic setting, the manager may also 
systematically overestimate the probability of the good scenario for the LT project, 
exacerbating the above distortion even further.  
3. Optimism is Stronger for Long-Term Projects  
The previous subsection illustrated how even “equal opportunity” optimism can 
disproportionally favor long-term investments—simply by dint of the higher volatility of 
such project by dint of their longer time periods. This Section will argue that there are 
additional reasons to believe that optimism manifests specifically for long-term projects. 
That is, for long-term projects managers will be particularly prone to overestimating the 
probability of success more than they would for a short-term project. Recall that the 
previous section assumed that for both the LT and the ST investment, an optimistic 
manager would assess the probability of the good scenario to occur as 60%, instead of the 
objective probability of 50%. Below, we will argue that for LT projects, she plausibly will 
assess this probability to be even higher. For example, while the overconfident manager 
will assess the probability of a ST project to succeed at 60% instead of the objective 50%, 
the same overconfident manager will assess the probability of the LT project to succeed at 
70% or 80% instead of the objective 50%. This overconfidence “premium” for long-term 
factors can be driven by many factors – such as illusion of control, overestimation of 
                                               
106 David Hirshleifer, Angie Low & Siew Hong Teoh, Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? 67 J. OF 
FIN. 1457 (2012). The association of volatility and overconfidence is not limited to executives’ behavior. For 
instance, analysts’ overconfidence bias increases with uncertainty, measured by standard deviation of 
earnings forecast. Lucy F. Ackert & George Athanassakos, Prior Uncertainty, Analyst Bias, and Subsequent 















Term 200 320 0.5 0.5 260 0.4 0.6 272 
Long 
Term 0 500 0.5 0.5 250 0.4 0.6 300 
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relevance of one’s skills, competition neglect, commitment to the project, and lack of 
reference class – each of which is aggravated as investment time periods extend.107 We 
discuss each factor in turn. 
 
An emerging academic literature finds that managers are overconfident with respect to 
the likelihood that their project will succeed in part because they believe that they can 
control the underlying risk. Surveys of executives have found, for example, that managers 
typically believe with the right efforts and planning, they can significantly improve the 
odds of their project to succeed.108 This illusion of control is so strong, one study found, 
that executives rarely accept risk estimates as given - even with respect to pure chances 
events they tend to undue exhibit optimism.109  The long time horizon that long-term 
investments entail mechanically perpetuates this illusion of control – as executives 
convince themselves that over time solutions will be found, and obstacles overcome. 
Navistar’s CEO Ustian, for example, vested his confidence in a revolutionary EGR 
technology bolstered in part because his company almost nearly a decade to develop the 
technology before new environmental standards were scheduled to come into effect. 
Similarly, even after it was clear that Yahoo was drawing its final breaths, Marissa Mayer 
in her last interview suggested that several more years was all she needed, in order for her 
plan to succeed and for Yahoo to be saved.  
 
A second factor that asymmetrically increases managers’ long-term overconfidence is 
their tendency to overestimate the relevance of their own skill; neglect importance of 
others’ skills; and neglect potential downstream competition.110 For long-term projects, 
where ambiguity reigns, these biases have real bite, since it is not yet clear which skills 
could maximize success.111 Indeed, ambiguity has been shown to magnify optimism: in 
one influential study, when subjects were free to come up with different traits that justify 
their high evaluation of themselves, they were highly optimistic. When they were given a 
list of traits, however, they rank themselves lower than they previously did.112 For long-
                                               
107 David Dunning, Judith A. Meyerowitz & Amy D. Holzberg, Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of 
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, 57 J. OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYC. 1082 
(1989). 
108 March & Shapira, supra note 91 (results from a survey).  
109  Id.; see also Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails it's Chance: The Illusion of Control as a 
Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J. OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 951 (1975). 
110 See Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23; Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold 
Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 17, at 27 (1993) [hereinafter 
Kahneman & Lovallo, Timid Choices] (“people also exaggerate their control over events and the importance 
of the skills and resources they possess in ensuring desirable outcomes “) 
111 Furthermore, even when information is available, people tend to think about future events in general form 
and postpone the details to a later time. See e.g., Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, Temporal construal, 110 
PSYCH. REV., 430 (2003) (“Construal level theory (CLT) specifically proposes that individuals use more 
abstract mental models, or higher level construals, to represent information about distant future events than 
information about near-future events.”); Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, Temporal Construal Theory of 
Time-Dependent Preferences.  In J. Carillo & I. Brocas and J. D. Carrill (Eds.), THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ECONOMIC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING.  OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. (2003). 
112 David Dunning, Judith A. Meyerowitz & Amy D. Holzberg, Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of 
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, 57 J. OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYC. 1082 
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term projects, thus, where details are most lacking and fortunes most ambiguous, managers 
will focus on their positive skills, traits and general advantages, even if the traits will turn 
out not to be relevant.  
 
Third, managers also neglect other managers’ skills, and accordingly potential 
competition. For long-term projects, the bias is plausibly stronger since future competition 
is difficult to predict when the project is initiated.  Furthermore, competition neglect is 
exacerbated when a manager overestimates the relevance of his skills, which, as argued 
before, is also more likely with respect to long-term projects. In an entry game experiment, 
managers were more likely to enter the market with a new company when they were told 
that success in competition was skill-driven than when it was drawn randomly.113  
 
Finally, there is also direct evidence that a distant “finish line” augurs higher degrees 
of overconfidence directly. For example, college students were pretty optimistic about their 
first-year salaries, but became significantly less optimistic as graduation approached.114 
Similarly, students were more optimistic with respect to their performance in the midterm 
exam when asked at the beginning of the semester, than on the day of the exam itself.115 
Furthermore, subjects who were asked to predict their performance in a number of arbitrary 
tasks were significantly more optimistic when asked long before the task than immediately 
prior to performing it.116 
 
Executives’ predictions, too, appear more optimistic with respect to long-term 
projects. A study analyzing three- to five-year earnings growth forecasts among executives 
finds that these long-term forecasts were highly overoptimistic, significantly exceeding 
actual growth rates.117 The average long-term growth forecast predicted (15%) was five 
times larger than the average realized growth rate (3%). Also, consistent with their 
optimistic long-term beliefs, overconfident CEOs were found to specifically bargain for 
                                               
(1989). 
113 Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach, 89 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 306 (1999) (finding in an experiment that overconfidence about skill leads to excessive entry). 
114 Shepperd, J. A., Ouellette, J. A., & Fernandez, J. K., Abandoning Unrealistic Optimism: Performance 
Estimates and the Temporal Proximity of Self-Relevant Feedback, 70 J. OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH., 844 
(1996). Juniors' and sophomores' optimism, in contrast, did not decline over the year, suggesting that the 
proximity to benchmarking moments uniquely dampens optimism. Id. 
115 See Thomas Gilovich, Margaret Kerr & Victoria H. Medvec. The Effect of Temporal Perspective on 
Subjective Confidence. 64 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 552 (1993); See also Armor & Taylor, Predictions Fail, 
supra note 88. 
116 See Gilovich et al., Id.; See also  Armor & Taylor, Predictions Fail, supra note 88. 
117 Linda Bamber, David Koo & Eric P.  Yeung, Managers' Forecasts of Long-Term Growth in Earnings: 
New Information or Wishful Thinking? available at 
https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/Eric%20Yeung.pdf 
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more options-intensive compensation packages118 with multi-year vesting and expiration 
periods.119  
 
In sum, the emerging literature on managerial overconfidence, its origins, and its 
triggers lends both direct and indirect evidence that optimism bias is likely to thrive 
systematically with regards to long-term projects.  
B. Weak Constraints on Long-Term Optimism 
The previous subsection argued that optimism’s origins and triggers interact materially 
with long-term horizons and the vagueness of the project. These findings alone would still 
not pose a particular problem if there existed reliable constraints that put a damper on long-
term biases.  We take up this issue below, arguing that the usual constraints on 
overconfidence tend to be weaker for long-term projects.  
1. Inside View, Outside View, and Durable Long-Termism 
 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who made seminal contributions to the research 
of overconfidence bias, explored several ways that optimism could potentially be 
mitigated. As they found in a well-known series of experiments, optimism results from 
people’s tendency to adopt an “Inside View”– based solely on plans, scenarios and 
simulations they run subjectively, while ignoring an “Outside View” – one based on 
statistical analysis and aggregate data from similarly situated cases.120 The inside view can 
fall prey to natural bias, since one’s plans tend naturally to focus on success scenarios, 
discounting potential obstacles. In short, managers “rarely plan to fail”.121 For example, 
people who were asked to assess time of task completion in experiments, constructed 
forecasts that are close to the best-case scenario while ignoring relevant statistics and 
experience about obstacles.122 As a result, they suffered from a Planning Fallacy – a 
common bias in estimating how long it takes to complete a task.123  
 
                                               
118  Mark Humphery-Jenner, Ling Lei Lisic, Vikram Nanda, & Sabatino Dino Silverie, Executive 
Overconfidence and Compensation Structure. 119 J. OF FIN. ECON. 553 (2016) [hereinafter, Humphery-
Jenner et al., Overconfidence & Compensation] 
119 Brian D. Cadman, Tjomme O. Rusticus & Jayanthi Sunder, Stock Option Grant Vesting Terms: Economic 
and Financial Reporting Determinants, 18 REV. OF ACC. STUD. 1159 (2013). 
120 See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 23. 
121 See Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 198-268 ; See also David A. Armor & Shelly E. Taylor, 
Situated Optimism: Specific Outcome Expectancies and Self-Regulation, 30 ADV. EXPERIM. SOC. PSYCH. 309 
(1998) [hereinafter Armor & Taylor, Situated Optimism].   
122  See Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 250; see also Roger Buehler, Dale W. Griffin, & Margaret 
Ross, Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why People Underestimate their Task Completion Times, 67 J. OF 
PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH., 366 (1994). 
123 Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 250.  
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If, however, one contrasts these individual best-case scenarios (the inside view), with 
a data driven analysis (the outside view), debiasing is possible.124 For example, when 
college students were asked to forecast their future academic performance, on average they 
predicted it will be better than 84% of their peers. However, when students were asked first 
about their entrance scores, as well as their peers entrance scores, their predictions were 
significantly less sanguine. 125  Thus, to avoid unrealistic predictions, Kahneman and 
Tversky recommend, managers should conduct a “reference class forecasting” – that is, in 
making forecasts with respect to their own projects, they should rely on the distribution of 
outcomes of similar “benchmark” projects. 
 
People, however, frequently ignore the outside view. 126  For example, asking the 
external question – how long does it usually take to complete this kind of project? – could 
result with a significantly better estimation of time of completion.127 Yet, as Kahneman 
reports, while working on a curriculum construction project for the Israeli Army, the entire 
team (including himself) ignored this information, leading to a drastic underestimation of 
time of completion.128 The tendency to ignore the outside view affects managers and 
organizations.129 Managers are not likely to solicit such a view, and even if they do it can 
frequently be ignored.130 Indeed, a review of several hundred forecasts of transportation 
infrastructure projects’ costs and demand found that not one of them included a reference 
class forecast.131 
 
Long-term projects belong to a special class – one that would benefit most from the 
outside view (if adopted), but at the same time are least likely to receive it.132 The value of 
                                               
124 See Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23, at  80 (“The outside view is more likely to produce 
accurate forecasts and much less likely to deliver highly unrealistic ones”); Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard 
H. Thaler, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (YALE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2008) (“if people are reminded of a bad event, they may not continue to be so optimistic.”) 
125 See Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23, at 79  (this second group of students predicted on 
average a performance that is better than 64% of their peers). 
126 See Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23; Kahneman & Lovallo, Timid Choices, supra note 
110.  
127 Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 250.  
128 Id. 
129 See Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23. 
130  See Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23, at 77 (“Even when companies bring in independent 
consultants to assist in forecasting, they often remain stuck in the inside view. If the consultants provide 
comparative data on other companies or projects, they can spur useful outside-view thinking. But if they 
concentrate on the project itself, their analysis will also tend to be distorted by cognitive biases.”) 
131 See Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius & Werner Rothengatter, MEGAPROJECTS AND RISK: AN ANATOMY OF 
AMBITION (Cambridge University Press 2003); Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette K. Skamris Holm & Søren L. Buhl, 
What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects? 24 TRANS. REV. 3 (2004); Bent Flyvbjerg, 
Mette K. Skamris Holm, and Søren L. Buhl, 2005, How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works 
Projects? The Case of Transportation, 71 J. OF THE AMER. PLANN. ASSOC., 131 (2005). 
132 Cf. Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23, at 68 (“The outside view’s advantage is most 
pronounced for initiatives that companies have never attempted before—like building a plant with a new 
manufacturing technology or entering an entirely new market. It is in the planning of such de novo efforts 
that the biases toward optimism are likely to be great. Ironically, however, such cases are precisely where the 
organizational and personal pressures to apply the inside view are most intense. “) 
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the outside view seems evident for long-term projects, which (as discussed above) involve 
especially high level of optimism, and since optimism is highly influential in distorting 
their value.133 For several reasons, however, managers are not likely to contrast these long-
term projects with data.  First, an outside view requires identifying an appropriate reference 
class – a group of similar benchmarks – that would provide relevant data.134 Long-term 
projects, however, are typically unique (often by design), making a reference class scarce, 
or highly subjective.135 Furthermore, since managers construct long-term investment plans 
around their unique skills, external benchmarks might make them even more skeptical that 
a posited reference class has probative value.136  
 
Second, the initial plan of a long-term project is predominantly composed more of 
inspiration than detailed implication, pregnant with the promise of vagueness that reduces 
the likelihood that managers will contrast it against benchmarking data. Kahneman and 
Tversky found that more than any other factor, the main reason to people ignore the outside 
view is the strength of the narrative they have, and particularly its coherence. A good, 
coherent story often carries far more weight for many than cold, statistical evidence.137 
And a good coherent story, as Kahneman explains, is especially conjurable when objective 
facts are scarce: 
You build the best possible story from the information available to you, and if it is a good 
story, you believe it.  Paradoxically, it is easier to construct a coherent story when you 
know little, when there are fewer pieces to fit into the puzzle.138   
For long-term projects, since little information is available (almost by definition), managers 
are free to construct alternative scenarios, all of which could be designed to be perfectly 
coherent, and highly overconfident.  
2. Lack of Clear and Immediate Feedback 
 
In addition to a lack of existing comparison benchmarks, overconfidence for long-term 
projects also tends to lack another bridling force, in the form of clear and immediate 
feedback. The mere expectation of a clear and immediate feedback, several researchers 
                                               
133 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
134 See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 23. 
135 See Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23 at 68 (“Of course, choosing the right class of 
analogous cases becomes more difficult when executives are forecasting initiatives for which precedents are 
not easily found. …Imagine that planners have to forecast the results of an investment in a new and unfamiliar 
technology.”) 
136  See Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 23, at 2-3 (“The tendency to neglect 
distributional information and to rely mainly on singular information is enhanced by any factor that increases 
the perceived uniqueness of the problem.") 
137 In a line of experiments Tversky and Kahneman found that coherency has significant, if not the most 
significant, influence on predictions. See Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 264 (“confidence is 
determined by the coherence of the story one has constructed, not by the quality and amount of the 
information that supports it.“).   
138  Kahneman, Thinking, supra note 23, at 201.  
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have found, dampens undue optimism in making predictions.139 In one experiment, for 
example, participants were asked to assess the likelihood of testing positive to a serious 
medical condition. Assuming that they receive the results in 3-4 weeks participants were 
overoptimistic, assessing a less than average likelihood. Yet, close to the end of the 
experiment, after these participants learned that results would be available in a few minutes, 
they largely abandoned their optimism, assessing an average likelihood instead.140  
 
With long-term projects, however, feedback is often vague, noisy, and distant. They 
are by definitions cash-flow money pits early on, with only the prospect of compensating 
benefits years down the road.141 Furthermore, over a long-duration, managers have plenty 
of opportunities to attribute failure to exogenous events that are not in their control. Such 
discounting of interim feedback—often referred to as attribution bias—further weakens 
the power and discipline of a long-term project feedback. 142  The feedback is less 
intimidating, since managers know, whether consciously or not, that so many things that 
will happen could be responsible to a project failure, if it occurs. 
3. Limited Learning 
 
While impoverished learning is a problem for any project, managers’ persistence and 
stubbornness in the face of new relevant information is particularly pernicious and 
damaging in the context of long-term projects. By the time information arrives, managers 
are typically already highly invested in their project’s success, and their future career 
trajectories are also in play. Such highly motivated reference points, several studies have 
found, impede learning and exacerbate overconfidence. People motivated to reach a result 
search their memory for facts beliefs that support it, and ignore negative information.143 
For example, subjects who were promised a refund for finishing their tax filings early 
showed higher optimism with respect to time to complete their reports.144  
 
Second, even though the initial business plan for long-term projects is often based on 
sparse information—and thus is likely to have low predictive power—due to a 
phenomenon known as anchoring bias, subsequent assessments of the project are highly 
                                               
139 Armor & Taylor, Predictions Fail, supra note 88 (reporting studies showing that optimism is sensitive to 
timing of expected feedback).  
140 Kevin M. Taylor & James A. Shepperd, Bracing for the Worst: Severity, Testing and Feedback as 
Moderators of the Optimistic Bias. 24 PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL., 915 (1998). 
141  See DellaVigna & Pollet, supra note 24.  
142 See e.g., Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact Or 
Fiction? 82 PSYCH. BULLET. 213, 213-215 (1975); Norman T. Feather & JG Simon, Attribution of 
Responsibility and Valence of Outcome in Relation to Initial Confidence and Success and Failure of Self and 
Other, 18 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH., 173 (1971). 
143 See e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL., 480 (1990).  
144 See e.g., Roger Buehler, Dale W. Griffin, & Heather MacDonald, The Role of Motivated Reasoning in 
Optimistic Time Predictions, 23 PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 238 (1997); See also Marks, R. W. The Effects 
of Probability, Desirability, and "Privilege" on the Stated Expectations of Children. 79 J. OF PERSONALITY 
332 (1951) (kids were more likely to predict that they draw a particular card from a mixed pack when they 
stood to gain a point for each card). 
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influenced by initial assessments, even if they were informed by forecasts that were 
admittedly arbitrary.145 In a RAND study of major companies, for example, costs turned 
out to be more than double that initially assessed, and performance less than half 
anticipated.146 Anchoring on an uniformed initial plans could result in significant costs 
since anchoring persists even when the initial numbers are clearly wrong.147  
 
Third, for typical long-term projects, relevant information becomes revealed only 
gradually. This can lead to a biased and asymmetric form of updating, where managers 
habitually dismiss negative information and embrace positive news, thereby reinforcing 
their initial optimism. Asymmetric treatment of positive versus negative news has been 
observed in numerous experimental contexts, as well as in neuroscience studies.148 In a line 
of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) based studies, participants were asked to estimate 
their likelihood of experiencing particular adverse life events such as Parkinson’s disease, 
Alzheimer’s disease, car theft or robbery, before and after they were presented with the 
average probability of these events for people in their socio cultural environment.149 
Updating beliefs in response to information was remarkably asymmetric - brain activity 
showed failure of the frontal lobe regions to code for errors, when coding would have 
reduced individual’s optimism (increase probability for adverse event). 150  Furthermore, 
overconfidence is associated with stronger updating bias. In a field experiment, the 
Canadian Inventor assistance program provided inventors with an objective assessment of 
the commercial prospects of their invention. After receiving a projection of failure (which 
as the organization track record suggests was highly accurate), only half of the inventors 
abandoned their project. Furthermore, persistence was associated with high individual 
optimism and resulted in average losses.151 On top of that,  a common source of asymmetric 
updating, attribution bias–namely, the tendency to take credit for success, and attribute 
failure to bad luck– is stronger for long-term investments, since the longer time-horizon 
                                               
145 Kahneman & Lovallo, Delusions, supra note 23, at 74 (“This intuitive and seemingly unobjectionable 
process has serious pitfalls, however. Because the initial plan will tend to accentuate the positive—as a 
proposal, it’s designed to make the case for the project—it will skew the subsequent analysis toward 
overoptimism”); Dan Ariely, George Lowenstein, & Drazen Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand 
Curves without Stable Preferences. 118 QUART. J. OF ECON., 73 (2003); Dan Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) 
146  Merrow, E.W., Chapel, S.W., and Worthing, C., Review of Cost Estimation in New Technologies: 
Implications for Energy Process Plants, 1979, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA (USA). 
147 Timothy D. Wilson, Christopher E. Houston, Kathryn M. Etling & Nancy Brekke, A New Look at 
Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring and its Antecedents, J. OF EXPERIM. PSYCH. (1996) (warning participants 
of an anchoring effect did not help them avoid it); Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the 
Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J.OF PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 437 
(1997) (anchoring effect were found even though initial numbers were clearly wrong). 
148 Sharot et al., supra note 25, at 1475 (2011) (“highly optimistic individuals exhibited reduced tracking of 
estimation errors that called for negative update in right inferior prefrontal gyrus.”) 
149 Id.  
150 Id., at 1477-78. 
151 Thomas Astebro, The Return to Independent Invention: Evidence of Unrealistic Optimism, Risk Seeking 
or Skewness Loving? 113 ECON. J. 226, 229 & tbl.1 (2003). 
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typically presents multiple opportunities for managers to chalk up failure to exogenous 
events.152  
 
Finally, evidence supports the phenomenon of managers’ resistance to feedback with 
respect to long-term investments. Overconfident CEOs, which were found to have weak 
inclination to amend material errors in their forecasts in light of corrective feedback, were 
especially unresponsive when the feedback related to forecasts with long time horizon.153 
C. Illustrative Examples – Long-Term Bias and Hedge Fund Activism 
 
In the previous subsections, we have argued that overconfidence and optimism bias 
are present for corporate managers, that they are particularly likely to be concentrated in 
long-term projects, and that the usual factors that bridle or dampen the effects of 
overconfidence are also likely to be limited with long-term investments. In this Part we 
turn to a series of case studies that offer examples from three well-known companies 
(Yahoo, AOL and Navistar) where long-term investment decisions were arguably biased 
by overconfidence, and their most deleterious effects were ultimately interrupted by hedge 
fund activism. Subsection 1 discusses Marissa Mayer hiring by Yahoo board; her 
investments as Yahoo CEO; activist Starboard Value’s intervention to cut investments, and 
the eventual sale of Yahoo core assets to Oath - a Verizon subsidiary led by Tim 
Armstrong, the former CEO of AOL; Subsection 2 discusses Armstrong’s $1 billion 
investment in his own long-term project, Patch, during his tenure as AOL’s CEO—
followed by the company’s eventual sale due to an intervention by the same activist; 
Subsection 3 discusses Navistar’s long-term investment in the novel EGR technology, 
advocated by then-CEO Dan Ustian, and which resulted in Navistar becoming the target of 
three hedge fund activists, resulting the Ustian’s ouster and SEC charges.   
 
Any of these episodes could have been described as examples of short-termist 
interventions in long-term investments (and indeed they were so characterized at the 
time).154 A closer inspection, however, reveals that each of them also involved factors that 
                                               
152 See e.g., Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or 
Fiction? 82 PSYCH. BULLET. 213, 213-225 (1975); Norman T. Feather & JG Simon, Attribution of 
Responsibility and Valence of Outcome in Relation to Initial Confidence and Success and Failure of Self and 
Other, 18 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH., 173 (1971). 
153  Guoli Chen, Craig Crossland & Luo Shuqing, Making the Same Mistake All Over Again: CEO 
Overconfidence and Corporate Resistance to Corrective Feedback, 36 STRAT. MANAG. J. 1513 (2015)  
154 See e.g., Martin Lipton, Lessons from the AOL Proxy Fight, HARV. L. SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (June 22, 2012) available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/06/22/lessons-from-the-aol-
proxy-fight/ [hereinafter Lipton, AOL Proxy Fight] (“These results confirm that investors will not blindly 
follow the recommendation of ISS — when presented with a well-articulated and compelling plan for the 
long-term success of the Company, they are able to cut through the cacophony of short-sighted gains 
promised by activist investors touting short-term strategies.”); Sanjay Sanghoee, Yahoo’s Mayer Should Take 
On Starboard, FORTUNE (Oct. 23, 2014), available at http://fortune.com/2014/10/23/how-yahoos-mayer-
should-take-on-starboard/ (“Jeffrey Smith, who runs Starboard, is in the business of maximizing 
shareholder wealth in the short-term. But Mayer’s job is to create value in the long-term, and in the 
Starboard version of this deal, she may have to give up the growth strategy that could be key to Yahoo’s 
success.”); Joe Necora, Out of the Spotlight, an Industry Copes With Crisis, NYTIMES  MAG. (NOV. 28, 
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betray the markers of managerial overestimation of (and overinvestment in) long-term 
projects. In each case, the significant potential upside was highly tempting; the inevitable 
vagueness of each initial plan fostered illusions of control, overestimation of managerial 
skill, and competition neglect; the managers became highly committed to their long-term 
visions, and unrealistically invested in the project/strategy as contrary facts dribbled in; 
and, in all cases, the company was generating a significant internal cash flow that 
underwrite the long-term projects.   
1. Marissa Mayer’s Long-Term Plan for Yahoo 
 
On the morning of July 11, 2012, Marissa Mayer, then a Google executive, entered 
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher’s offices at Palo Alto, CA. Mayer was one of the four finalists 
for Yahoo’s CEO position, and this was the final meeting with Yahoo board before they 
made a final decision.155 Going in, Mayer’s odds at landing the job appeared long (to say 
the least). Yahoo’s board was concerned that Mayer, who had recently been demoted from 
Google’s search division and top management team, did not have the experience to manage 
a company at Yahoo size: Mayer had never managed or even headed a division in a public 
company; she managed roughly 20 employees at Google; and she evidently had little 
managerial experience with accounting statements.156 Furthermore, Mayer faced a serious 
competition from within Yahoo: Ross Levinsohn, the interim CEO, who had interviewed 
earlier that morning–and had support from most of the members of Yahoo’s board.157  
 
Mayer and Levinsohn floated markedly different visions for Yahoo’s future. 
Levinsohn offered the board a safe, low-risk low reward plan - to take out Yahoo from 
competition with Google and Facebook by moving it to the content business. Mayer, on 
the other hand, offered an ambitious long-term plan, that if successful could make Yahoo 
directly competitive with Google and Facebook. While some board members initially 
preferred Levinsohn’s safer plan,158 others viewed it as overly conservative “small ball”, 
                                               
2008), Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29nocera.html?_r=0 (“Though no one at 
Navistar can prove it, they strongly suspect that the stock has been hammered because hedge funds, badly 
hurt during this phase of the financial crisis, have been forced to sell some of their more liquid positions to 
return money to existing shareholders. I suspect this theory is correct, and it would be yet another way that 
fallout from the financial crisis has spread from New York to the rest of the country.”) 
155 See Nicholas Carlson, MARISSA MAYER AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE YAHOO! pp.237-238 (Grand Central 
Publishing 2016) [hereinafter Carlson, MARISSA MAYER]. 
156 See Carlson, MARISSA MAYER, id., at 237-238 (“An unnamed Google executive opined on Mayer’s hire: 
‘It will be a struggle. She’s never managed more than ten to twenty people. She’s a product person who hasn’t 
managed sales, business development, human resources and all that.’”) 
157 Id., at 220 (“For the two months prior, the new chairman of Yahoo’s board, Fred Amoroso, had made it 
clear that he was going to do everything he could to make sure Levinsohn and his team would be running the 
company for the foreseeable future. “)  
158 Id., at 231 (“The directors who opposed Mayer— most vocally Amoroso, but also Brad Smith and David 
Kenny— argued that Levinsohn, with his “media” strategy, had a better plan for Yahoo than Mayer and her 
“products” strategy. They argued that Mayer may present a greater upside—she was more likely to come up 
with the next Facebook or Google Maps or Twitter—but that Levinsohn was the safer bet, a more guaranteed 
return.”)   
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preferring the high upside in Mayer’s vision.159 As the evening of July 11 wore on, the 
latter faction prevailed and Yahoo’s board voted unanimously to name Marissa Mayer as 
CEO.  
 
There is little doubt that Yahoo’s board, in selecting Mayer, opted with her high-risk / 
high-reward long-term plan. And, as noted above, a high volatility, big upside is one of the 
reasons why long-term investments can be vulnerable to overestimation. Indeed, even a 
little overconfidence on the board side in the plan’s prospects to succeed could lead to great 
over estimation of the plan. A long-term investor, in fact—Citi’s Mark Mahaney—
expressed concerns about the risk involved: 
What we are a bit worried about is that by selecting Ms. Mayer, Yahoo! is explicitly pursuing 
an aggressive and bold Growth strategy, whereas we believe a Value strategy might be more 
appropriate.160 
Furthermore, a long-term horizon could arguably have contributed to overestimation 
of the relevance of Mayer’s skills to the success of the plan, while neglecting potential 
downstream competition. Adding to the credibility of Mayer’s plan were her user-focused 
experience at Google and her pedigree with search technology.161 The plan’s features were 
closely related to Mayer’s skills: creating great apps for daily habits, such as news, weather, 
email, and photos. 162  And most notably, the plan involved creating a new search 
application, which Mayer believed could significantly improve Yahoo’s search market 
share and revenues.163  Mayer and the board, however, did not predict how intensely 
competitive the Apps market were about to become. When Yahoo Apps finally came out 
– as companies, startups, and individuals were all constantly producing iPhone applications 
– only two of Yahoo’s Apps made it to Apple’s top 100.164   
 
Shortly after becoming Yahoo CEO, Mayer embarked on a shopping spree, spending 
hundreds of millions of dollars to acquire dozens of small startups. Mayer relied on internal 
funds - proceeds that Yahoo was receiving predominantly from its holdings in Alibaba. 
Yet, when Yahoo’s initial acquisitions and investments did not produce the desired results, 
Mayer’s solution was to double down with more investments. Mayer announced to 
                                               
159 Id., at 221 (“Harry Wilson, another director brought onto the board by Loeb, joined Wolf in his criticism 
of the deal as ‘shortsighted.’“) 
160 See Robert Hoff, What Google Veteran Marissa Mayer Can Do As Yahoo's New CEO, FORBES (Juy 16, 
2012) available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2012/07/16/surprise-googles-marissa-mayer-is-
yahoos-new-ceo/#2cec2c8c7e0f. Overconfidence with respect to long-term projects affects investors only to 
a limited extent, if at all. For a discussion of the internal factors that affect managers’ overconfidence and 
long-term bias see infra Parts III.B. & III.C. 
161 See e.g., Amir Efrati & John Letzing, Google's Mayer Takes Over as Yahoo Chief, WSJ (July 17, 2012) 
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303754904577531230541447956 (“Yahoo's 
board selected Ms. Mayer because "she stands for the user," in contrast with a string of the company's 
previous CEOs who had little experience with consumer websites, said a person with direct knowledge of 
the company's CEO search.”) 
162 Carlson, MARISSA MAYER, supra note 155, at 250-251.  
163 Carlson, id., at 286.  
164 Carlson, id., at 305.  
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shareholders a potential plan to sell its Alibaba’s holdings and use half of the proceeds to 
further invest in Yahoo’s long-term plan. This was an explicit deviation from Yahoo’s 
initial plan, pre-Mayer, to distribute such proceeds to investors.165  
 
In July 29, 2014, Eric Jackson published a Forbes column titled, “How do you solve a 
problem like Marissa?” advocating the need to stop Mayer from spending, and require 
management to distribute the Alibaba proceeds to shareholders.166 Jackson noted that 
Yahoo’s market value was—incongruously—below that of the company’s holdings in 
Alibaba, a fact suggesting that investors placed a negative value on Yahoo’s core 
management. 167  Shortly after publication of Jackson’s column, Mayer’s management 
became the target of Starboard Value CEO, Jeff Smith, a renowned activist.168 Echoing 
Jackson concerns’ in a letter to management, Smith warned against Mayer spending 
additional capital on acquisitions, instead admonishing her to distribute it to shareholders. 
At first, Mayer cut a secret deal with Smith to cut costs and increase buybacks, in return 
for Smith’s forbearance on a proxy fight. 169  Yet, following this agreement Yahoo’s 
expenses began to accelerate.170 Indeed, Despite Yahoo’s weak results, Mayer did not seem 
to lose faith in her plan and its potential to rehabilitate Yahoo. On the company’s 4Q 2015 
earning call, Mayer reiterated her belief in her long-term plan for Yahoo stating; “Overall, 
I have very aggressive expectations for Yahoo's core business. We have the right talent, 
                                               
165  See e.g., Yahoo! Inc, Form 8-K (August 9, 2012) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312512347591/d394429d8k.htm (“Ms. Mayer is 
engaging in a review of the Company’s business strategy to enhance long term shareholder value...This 
review process may lead to a reevaluation of, or changes to, our current plans, including our restructuring 
plan, our share repurchase program, and our previously announced plans for returning to shareholders 
substantially all of the after tax cash proceeds of the initial share repurchase under the Share Repurchase and 
Preference Share Sale Agreement we entered into on May 20, 2012 with Alibaba Group Holding Limited.“) 
166  Eric Jackson, How do you Solve a Problem like Marissa? FORBES (July 29, 2014), available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericjackson/2014/07/29/how-do-you-solve-a-problem-
likemarissa/33447f527b6d  
167 Id. (“.. investors would rather get all of the cash coming back to Yahoo from the pending Alibaba IPO as 
well as what’s already on the balance sheet, rather than see CEO Marissa Mayer and her management team 
spend it on value-destroying acquisitions.“); See also Jeff Smith, Starboard Value Letter to Marissa Mayer, 
President and CEO of Yahoo, and to Yahoo's Board of Directors (September 26, 2014) available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/starboard-delivers-letter-to-ceo-and-board-of-directors-of-
yahoo-inc-277223182.html (“This substantial valuation gap is likely due to the fact that investors currently 
expect Yahoo to continue its past practices of … using the cash proceeds from such sales to acquire businesses 
at massive valuations with seemingly little to no regard for profitability and return on capital.“) 
168 Smith was not the first activist to target Yahoo. Dan Loeb, who brought Mayer to Yahoo, also pressured 
her to cut costs and return Alibaba money to shareholders. But he exited Yahoo several months earlier – 
taking on Mayer’s offer to greenmail him. See Carlson, MARISSA MAYER, supra note 155, at 276. (“Mayer 
went to Loeb and told him that Yahoo would buy forty million of his Yahoo shares at $ 29 per share. That 
was more than twice what he paid for them in the summer of 2011. The deal would reduce Third Point’s 
stake in Yahoo below 2 percent, forcing Wolf, Wilson, and Loeb to step down from the board, per Third 
Point’s settlement from the year prior.”)   
169 See Douglas MacMillan, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer Stumbled After Secret Truce With Investor, WSJ (June 
17,2016) available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoos-marissa-mayer-stumbled-after-secret-truce-with-
prodding-investor-1466174597 
170 See Id. 
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the right strategy, and the right assets to drive long-term sustainable growth for our 
investors.”171 And when the balance of its investments turned out not successful, Mayer 
embarked on a new, “bet-the-company” gambit—Project Index—a search on mobile 
application, which would make Yahoo competitive with Google and Facebook (or so 
Mayer believed).172  
 
Four years down the road, however, and close to $3 billion later in spending on over 
fifty acquisitions, the plan did not produce the growth investors and management hoped 
for. Quite to the contrary, Yahoo’s quarterly reports for First Q 2016 were exceptionally 
weak, showing declines across the board in Yahoo’s businesses’ market share, and 
profitability. In April 27, 2016 Yahoo reached a deal with Starboard’s Smith to nominate 
four members to the Board. And, in the end, it was Smith who successfully pushed for 
Yahoo to sell its core business.173 On July 25, 2016 Yahoo announced it closed a deal with 
Verizon in which Yahoo will sell its core businesses to Verizon for (a relatively modest) 
$4.5 billion. 
 
Whether Yahoo could have been saved had Mayer acted differently we can never know 
for sure. There is no doubt that Yahoo had long been a sinking ship that perhaps no one 
(including Meyer) could have righted. But even if this claim is true, without the Starboard 
intervention Mayer likely would have forged ahead with her turnaround plan.174 In a telling 
interview Mayer gave shortly before Yahoo was sold, Mayer refused to concede to 
mistakes. Rather, she insisted, “What’s needed…is a little more time.”175 Time, along with 
Meyer’s long-term plan, would solve the problem.176 In this unconquerable faith one can 
discern many of the seeds of long-term bias (as we have defined it). The excessive faith 
executives sometimes have in their long-term investments seemed present here. The 
ambitious, high potential upside plan of Mayer for Yahoo arguably acted to magnify the 
                                               
171 Q4 2015, Edited Transcript of YAHOO Conference Earning Call, Thomson Reuters, Street Events, 
October 21, 2016 available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/edited-transcript-yhoo-earnings-conference-
055111175.html 
172 See MacMillan, supra note 169. 
173See MacMillan, Id.  
174 See Todd Spangler, Yahoo’s False Prophet: How Marissa Mayer Failed to Turn the Company Around, 
VARIETY (May 24, 2016) (“Others say Mayer refuses to admit her failures, a stick-to-her-guns hubris that 
has made Yahoo slow to correct course when things weren’t working.”) available at 
https://www.yahoo.com/movies/yahoo-false-prophet-marissa-mayer-failed-turn-company-160630052.html 
175 See Diana Goovaerts, Mayer’s Three-Year Plan to Turn Yahoo into a Mobile Hitter, WIRELESSWEEK 
(March 15, 2016) https://www.wirelessweek.com/news/2016/03/mayers-three-year-plan-turn-yahoo-
mobile-hitter 
176  See Tiernan Ray, As the Yahoo! Turns: Mayer Defends Strategic Plan, M&A with Charlie Rose, 
BARRON’S (March 11, 2016), available at https://www.barrons.com/articles/as-the-yahoo-turns-mayer-
defends-strategic-plan-acquisitions-with-charlie-rose-1457714287 (“Here we are, when you look at what has 
happened, what did you do wrong? Asked Rose. Well, …I don't think the story has yet played out…A lot of 
tech turnaround adds we do take five, six, seven years.”); Douglas MacMillan, Marissa Mayer Wants Three 
More Years to Turn Around Yahoo, WSJ (March 11, 2016) available at 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2016/03/11/marissa-mayer-wants-three-more-years-to-turn-around-yahoo/ 
(“We have a three-year strategic plan. I can see how it will work and how we can actually get to a successful 
turnaround of Yahoo.”) 
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influence of overconfidence bias. In addition, due to the distant finish line and the 
inevitable vague nature of the plan, building it around Mayer’s skills and ignoring the role 
of luck and potential competition arguably lead to an even higher level of overconfidence. 
Finally, Mayer’s determination to stick to her guns, ignoring negative feedback and a 
mounting trove of negative data, is also symptomatic of long-term bias, where learning 
from feedback is limited by managers’ attachment to the project.  
2. Tim Armstrong, AOL, and Patch  
In an interesting (if ironic) twist, Yahoo’s core assets (now held by Verizon) would 
come to be managed by Tim Armstrong, a one-time salesperson who became the CEO of 
AOL (prior to its acquisition by Verizon).  Under Armstrong’s initial leadership, Oath – a 
Verizon subsidiary –  managed the combined assets of Yahoo and AOL.177 Similar to 
Mayer, Armstrong left Google to save AOL, which like Yahoo, was listing at the time he 
arrived. Saving AOL was a significant ask, but Armstrong believed AOL was undervalued, 
could benefit from a big bet, and was producing sufficient cash from its internet access 
business to invest in a necessary turnaround. 178 Furthermore, Armstrong believed he had 
a winning card – Patch, a local news web platform – that Armstrong had created while at 
Google.179 The application’s core idea was somewhat akin to the family of Facebook 
personalized news approach, but a differentiated product intended for one of "the last white 
spaces on the Internet" – creating a local community of users, and a hub for business 
owners.180  
 
Armstrong believed that Patch would provide the growth trajectory that would save 
AOL, and accordingly he conditioned his acceptance to the offer to run AOL on Patch’s 
acquisition. After joining AOL, Armstrong started pouring money into the project. Under 
his and the AOL board’s stewardship, AOL’s investment in Patch exceeded $300M. And, 
as with Mayer, Armstrong’s use of internal funds soon became the target of Jeff Smith, 
Starboard Value CEO. On January 13, 2012, Armstrong and AOL management met with 
Smith and his team, who wanted to discuss AOL expenses on Patch.181  Smith came 
prepared with highly detail presentation: Running the numbers for Patch, he argued, even 
under best-case scenarios, Patch would not cover the costs of salaries it was currently 
paying its employees.182 Armstrong’s response presentation included a big picture plan, 
                                               
177 In September 2018, Armstrong and Verizon parted company.  See Sarah Kraus, Verizon’s Internet Boss 
Tim Armstrong in Talks to Leave, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Sept. 7, 2018). 
178 See Nicolas Carlson, The Story Behind Why AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Fired an Employee In Front Of 
1,000 Coworkers, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 6, 2013), (hereinafter, Carlson, AOL Story] available at 
http://www.businessinsider.com/tim-armstrong-patch-aol-2013-10?op=1 
179 Armstrong already put some of his own money into Patch and made an old friend, Jon Brod, to become 
CEO of the company. See Id., at 2. http://www.businessinsider.com/tim-armstrong-patch-aol-2013-
10?page=2 
180 Id.  
181 Id., at 1. 
182 Id. 
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literally drawn on a white board with many boxes and arrows (but no numbers or financial 
details), a mixed-media composition that Smith found disconcerting.183  
 
After three more meetings on Patch failed to reach resolution, and in what has become 
a common ritual for hedge fund intervention, Smith demanded board representation; when 
Armstrong refused, Starboard commenced a proxy fight, which ultimately faltered. Martin 
Lipton was quick to declare the result as a victory of a “well developed”, “well-articulated” 
long-term management strategy over short-term, short-sighted, hedge fund strategy.184 The 
AOL victory showed, Lipton explained a client memo, that when management present a 
“compelling long-term strategy,” investors “are able to cut through the cacophony of short-
sighted gains promised by activist investors touting short-term strategies.”185  
 
Yet, in order to win the proxy fight, Armstrong was forced to cut a deal, making a 
promise that by the end of 2013 Patch would turn profitable (or it would be cut loose).186 
Following this promise, Armstrong became even more involved in the product, visiting 
Patch offices at least once a week and actively sharing his ideas with the product designers 
and with creative director Abel Lenz. 187  As the time passed, however, it became 
increasingly clear that Patch would not deliver on Armstrong’s promise; Armstrong 
nevertheless refused to acknowledge what his team was seeing.188 And, when AOL’s CFO 
Arthur Minson, who played a key role in winning the proxy fight, became vocal with 
respect to his Patch skepticism, Armstrong fired him.189 Eventually, however, on August 
2013, close to the looming deadline, Armstrong finally realized that there was no way 
around cutting Patch costs significantly. This defeat took a significant emotional toll on 
him.190 In an incident that would become notorious around Silicon Valley, Armstrong 
impulsively fired Abel Lenz during a company conference call involving around 1,000 co-
workers. The event which was later described as “probably the most intense moment you’ll 
ever hear during a workplace conference call,”191  was received as a negative sign of 
                                               
183 Id. (“As an activist investor, Smith has to meet with management teams all the time. For him, it's obvious 
when they know how their core businesses fit together with the businesses they are trying to grow and 
develop. But looking at Armstrong's board, full of arrows going all over the place, it seemed to Smith that 
Armstrong and his team were just grasping at straws, hoping that something they threw at the wall would 
stick.”) 
184 See e.g., Lipton, AOL Proxy Fight, supra note 154 (“The victory represents a clear and powerful message 
that a well-developed and well-articulated business strategy for long-term success will be supported by 
investors notwithstanding activist generated criticism and ISS support.”) 
185 Id.  
186 See Carlson, AOL Story, supra note 178. 
187 Id.  
188 Id. (“Armstrong's apparent stubbornness and blindness with respect to Patch, moreover, continued to cause 
significant friction between him and his senior team.”) 
189  Id. (“Minson was quite vocal about his skepticism about Patch. And in February 2013, Armstrong 
suddenly fired him.”) 
190 Id. (That Friday in August, Armstrong was finally making a decision that he had needed to make for a 
long time. And it was killing him. “) 
191 Nicholas Carlson, LEAKED AUDIO: Listen To AOL CEO Tim Armstrong Fire A Patch Employee In Front 
Of 1,000 Coworkers, BUSINESS INSIDER (August 12, 2013) [hereinafter Carlson, Leaked Audio] available at 
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Armstrong’s leadership temperament.192 On January 2014, AOL relinquished its control in 
Patch. The day after the announcement AOL market price rose 8%.193 Investors evidently 
appreciated Armstrong’s commitment to his promise.194 In many respects, then, Smith and 
Starboard lost the proxy fight, but they won the war.195 Without Starboard’s intervention 
Armstrong likely would not have undertaken his promise about Patch, and almost certainly 
would have soldiered ahead before giving up the idea of Patch becoming the engine of 
AOL growth.196  
 
Within our framework, the investment in Patch demonstrates the vulnerability of long-
term projects to overconfidence, and especially the difficulty their initiators confront in 
responding to negative data, including the unpleasant task of abandoning ship when 
needed. Armstrong became highly attached to Patch, to the extent that he did not compute 
the bottom line profitability, resisted incoming negative information, did not learn from 
feedback events, and—close to the end—became defensive and vindictive, losing (at least 
momentarily) his usual superb leadership skills. Looking back at the Patch episode with 
new perspective, Armstrong enumerated his mistakes, confessing regret for not looking at 
incoming data and proceeding too fast with the project: 
“The reality is what you need to do is listen to the best judgment you possibly can 
and try to look at the best data you possibly can. Then there’s gonna be some 
unknowns…The mistake I made was going exactly what you said, too bullish down a 
path without making sure those early positive metrics were actually coming true in all 
the other markets…Inside of a corporation, there’s a lot of non-reality that happens. 
Your job as a CEO or a leader of a group or a manager is to actually take a step back 
and say, “What’s the reality in this? Where are we? What do we need to change?” 197 
                                               
http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-audio-listen-to-aol-ceo-tim-armstrong-fire-a-patch-employee-
snapping-a-photo-2013-8. 
192 See Id. (“most people across the country and world saw it as gratuitous and humiliating: What's wrong 
with Tim Armstrong, people wondered? What kind of CEO fires some poor guy in front of all his colleagues? 
What did this say about what was going on at AOL? “) 
193 See Nicholas Carlson, Tim Armstrong Finally Got Rid Of Patch, And Wall Street Loves It, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (January 16, 2014), available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/tim-armstrong-killed-baby-wall-
181300569.html 
194 See Nicholas Carlson, The End of an Error: AOL Just Disposed of Controlling Interest in Patch, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter, Carlson, AOL’s Error] available at http://www.businessinsider.com/aol-
just-disposed-of-controlling-interest-in-patch-2014-1 (“Patch was always a mistake.  But today, Armstrong 
deserves tons of credit for honoring a promise he made to shareholders – especially since he has always had 
a deep emotional connection to the Patch project. “) 
195 See David Carr, AOL Chief’s White Whale Finally Slips His Grasp , NYTIMES MAGAZINE (Dec. 15, 2013) 
available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/business/media/aol-chiefs-white-whale-finally-slips-his-
grasp.html?_r=1 (“The insurgents lost the war, but turned out to be right.") 
196 See Carlson, AOL’s Error, supra note 194 (“We're pretty sure that if he had his way, AOL would still be 
investing in Patch. But he made a promise, and he stuck to it.”) 
197  See Full transcript: Oath CEO Tim Armstrong on Recode Media (Sep 3, 2017), available at  
https://www.recode.net/2017/9/3/16243970/transcript-oath-ceo-tim-armstrong-aol-patch-verizon-yahoo-
recode-media; See also Eric Johnson, What Yahoo and AOL CEO Tim Armstrong learned from Patch’s 
struggles, RECODE (August 31, 2017), available at https://www.recode.net/2017/8/31/16228076/yahoo-aol-
oath-verizon-ceo-tim-armstrong-learned-from-patch-struggles 
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3. Dan Ustian, Navistar & EGR Technology 
 
With no engineering background, but nonetheless climbing the ladder from within, 
Dan Ustian in 2004 became the CEO, President, and Chairman of the Board of Navistar 
Inc., an international manufacturer of trucks, busses and diesel engines. Under Ustian’s 
leadership Navistar became a poster child for R&D investment and growth - embarking 
into new directions, such as military vehicles and school buses, with global reach and 
technological innovation.198 Ustian’s commitment to innovation and long-term growth was 
so strong, in fact, that some suggested it was like he was managing an internet incubator 
rather than a truck and engine company.199 
 
In 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued a new regulation that 
would require the industry to meet a new, stricter quality standard for nitrogen dioxide 
pollutant—one that would have to be met by 2010. Rather than using the industry standard 
Selective Catalytic Reduction (“SCR”) technology, which Navistar’s competitors were all 
relying on to meet the new regulations, Ustian wanted Navistar to develop a novel, unique 
technology.200  The new technology that Ustian envisioned – Exhaust Gas Recirculation 
(“EGR”) – had clear advantages: it was less costly to apply and (more importantly) it saved 
drivers the need to keep an additional tank in the truck.201 If successful, EGR could provide 
Navistar with a significant competitive advantage, 202  (which, according to Navistar 
employees, was a typical Ustian obsession).203 In 2007 Navistar officially declared that it 
would pursue EGR technology rather than SCR, which would “come with a steep cost to 
                                               
198 See Joe Cahill on Business, Suits Can Innovate, Too, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (March31, 2012) 
available at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120331/ISSUE01/303319959/suits-can-innovate-too 
(“Navistar International Corp. CEO Dan Ustian churns out new products so fast, you’d think he was running 
an Internet incubator, not a 175-year-old company that once made the McCormick reaper.”)  
199 Id. 
200 See Joann Muller, Death by Hubris? The Catastrophic Decision that Could Bankrupt A Great American 




202 See International Trucks and Engines Will Comply with 2010 Emissions Standards without SCR, 
Navistar Investor Relations Release (Oct. 31, 2007), available at 
http://ir.navistar.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=272413 (“’While SCR is a means to achieve the NOx 
reduction requirement for 2010, it comes with a steep cost to our customers,’ said Daniel C. Ustian, Navistar 
chairman, president and chief executive officer. ‘Our ability to achieve our goals without adding customer 
cost and inconvenience is a competitive advantage for International.’”); Charlie Morasch, Digging Out, Land 
Line (October 2012), available at http://www.landlinemag.com/magazine/2012/oct/Section2/digging-
out.aspx (“Navistar, Allen said, wanted to have a long-term competitive advantage for its customers and 
against its competitors. Allen said such lasting advantages are a rarity, particularly in trucking, where 
innovations are quickly emulated.”) 
203 See Muller, Hubris, supra note 200 (“Above all, say those who worked closely with him, Ustian is 
obsessed with avoiding what happened to companies like Motorola or RIM, which notoriously lost their 
market leadership to more innovative rivals.”) 
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our customers,”204 Accordingly, the EGR became one of the three pillars in Navistar long-
term growth strategy.205  
 
Because of EGR’s novelty, there was a risk that EGR might not meet the EPA standard 
in time (or ever), but Ustian believed the engineers could achieve needed improvements by 
2010. Ustian’s confidence was so high, in fact, that the company developed no serious 
backup plan, as reflected in his answer to a question during an earnings conference call: 
“Plan B is we’re going to make Plan A work.”206 Furthermore, when difficulties with the 
EGR undertaking began to present themselves early on, Ustian was not open to discuss 
them with his engineers. As a former executive would later recall: 
“Dan is telling his technical people, ‘You’ve got to deliver,’ and they’re saying, ‘We don’t 
know how, but we’ll try,’” says the former executive. “There was a lot of tension in the 
technical community, from the scientists on up to the managers, about whether we should be 
agreeing to something we don’t know how to do. Dan didn’t want to hear any of it. ‘You’re 
going to get it done.’ He’s a positive thinker. He doesn’t like negative thinking.”207 
Ustian squelched concerns when Navistar began burning cash at growing, alarming 
rates on EGR.208 Such expenses, he reasoned, were necessary for Navistar’s successful 
achievement of long-term growth. 209  Accordingly, despite a significant decline in 
Navistar’s share price in 2008, Ustian’s confidence remained intact: the low market price 
was due to hedge funds liquidating their positions to meet recession redemptions and 
                                               
204 See Navistar Investor Relations Release, supra note 202. 
205 See e.g., Navistar International Corporation, Form 10-K, For the fiscal year ended October 31, 2010, 
available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/808450/000119312510285754/d10k.htm (“Our long 
term strategy is focused on three pillars: 1. Great Products:...Focusing on engine research and development 
in order to have a competitive advantage using Exhaust Gas Recirculation (‘EGR’) and other technologies 
for compliance with 2010 emissions standards”). 
206 See Muller, Hubris, supra note 200 (“The company had banked so many credits in earlier years that it 
could lawfully use them, in lieu of fines, all the way until this year. But rather than buying time for a plan B, 
Ustian, who was convinced a breakthrough was just around the corner, plowed forward with his EGR plan, 
full steam ahead. “); See also  Securities and Exchange Commission v. Daniel Ustian, Civil Action No. 16-
cv-3885 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois), at 8, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2016/comp23507.pdf (“As Ustian stated at a September 15, 2009 
conference attended by, among others, securities analysts, “Plan B is we’re going to make Plan A work.”) 
207 See Mueller, Hubris, supra note 200. 
208 See Joann Muller, Navistar Starts Paying The Piper For Its Costly Strategic Mistake, FORBES (August 31, 
2012), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2012/08/31/navistar-starts-paying-the-piper-
for-its-costly-strategic-mistake/#4376b008431d (“the primary concern, says Gimme Credit analyst Vicki 
Bryan, is the rate at which Navistar is burning cash.”) 
209   See Navistar Media Release (Dec. 21, 2009) available at 
http://media.navistar.com/index.php?s=43&item=344 (“Despite current economic challenges, we have 
remained focused on our three-pillar strategy which includes being profitable in the toughest of times while 
investing in our future for profitable growth,” said Daniel C. Ustian, Navistar’s chairman, president and 
CEO… “We believe that our customer-friendly solution positions our products with a significant competitive 
advantage,” said Ustian…“The momentum established in the wake of these accomplishments positions us 
well for long-term success and to take on the challenges that 2010 will pose for all in our industry.”); see also 
Cahill, supra note 198 (“For Mr. Ustian, the answer is innovation: “We've got some more breakthroughs 
coming.”) 
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margin calls.210 Similarly, when the company’s EGR efforts continued to flag and share 
price again declined 40% in 2012, Ustian’s answer was again moored to innovation: 
“We’ve got some more breakthroughs coming.”211 Wall Street, he argued, was suffering 
from short termism.212 Some analysts, however, believed that the decline in market price 
was not driven by short-termism but rather a lack of faith in management. As the value of 
the shares sank below $27, reflecting a multiplier of sales below 0.15 (less than a fourth of 
the median multiplier of its competitors), Patrick Nolan, an analyst for Penn Capital who 
sold its position to Navistar, opined to Bloomberg: “It’s a high-quality company with a 
management issue.”213 Indeed, by then Navistar became the target of three activists.214 
 
On July 6, 2012, as a result of the combined pressure of share value, hedge fund 
activism and mounting costs of non-compliance, Ustian finally gave up on EGR, 
announcing that the company would move to SCR technology. After 10 years of working 
on EGR and $700 million in spending, for the market it was too little too late.215 Navistar’s 
shares fell additional 15% that day, and the company faced a real risk of bankruptcy. On 
August 27, 2012 Navistar board, which in 2011 awarded Ustian with a large compensation 
package, ousted him. Activist Carl Icahn however, was not quite done. Icahn believed that 
any board that allowed this to happen could not shape Navistar’s future and navigate it 
safely out of the bankruptcy risk it now faced.  On Sept. 9, 2012 Icahn released an open 
letter to the board of directors demanding board sits. On July 15, 2013 Navistar agreed to 
let Icahn and Mark Rachesky appoint two directors each to Navistar board. The board also 
raised the company’s poison pill threshold from 15% to 20%. Navistar’s shares rose 10% 
in response.216 
 
                                               
210 Joe Necora, Out of the Spotlight, an Industry Copes With Crisis, NYTIMES  MAG. (NOV. 28, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29nocera.html?_r=0 (“Though no one at Navistar 
can prove it, they strongly suspect that the stock has been hammered because hedge funds, badly hurt during 
this phase of the financial crisis, have been forced to sell some of their more liquid positions to return money 
to exiting shareholders. I suspect this theory is correct, and it would be yet another way that fallout from the 
financial crisis has spread from New York to the rest of the country.”) 
211 See Cahill, supra note  198 (“Ustian’s innovations haven’t helped Navistar’s stock. Wall Street focuses 
on short-term earnings performance and truck sales forecasts. Thanks to a recent earnings shortfall and 
worries about the new truck engine, shares are down 40 percent from last May’s 52-week high and trade at a 
discount to its industry peers. Corporate raider Carl Icahn is pressuring the company into a merger.“) 
212 Id. 
213  Mark Clothier and Alex Barinka, Navistar Turns Target After Poison Pill Adopted, Real M&A, 
BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2012) available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-21/navistar-
turns-target-after-poison-pill-adopted-real-m-a 
214 See Scott Malone, Embattled Navistar adopts poison pill as big investors circle, REUTERS (June 20, 2012) 
available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/embattled-navistar-adopts-poison-pill-as-big-
investors-circle/article4356698/ 
215  See Kate Macarthur, Navistar's Plan B offers little confidence in its future, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS, 
(July 6, 2012, updated July 9, 2012) available at 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120706/NEWS05/120709911/navistars-plan-b-offers-little-
confidence-in-its-future 
216 See Liz Hoffman, Liz Hoffman, Navistar Deals with Ichan, Rachesky to Avoid Proxy Fight (July 15, 
2013), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/457245/navistar-deals-with-icahn-rachesky-to-avoid-
proxy-fight 
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Ustian’s fate at Navistar similarly bears markers of this article’s substantive thesis. 
Like Mayer and Armstrong, Ustian was drawn to the potential high upside of the EGR 
project – which could provide Navistar with a significant competitive advantage. The long-
time horizon made Ustian so confident that Navistar could succeed in developing the 
technology that he deliberately neglected developing a Plan B. Along the road, Ustian 
became increasingly invested in the project, so much so that he ignored mounting data and 
engineers’ concerns, dismissing the anemic market value that investors accorded Navistar, 
which to him was simply a reflection of short-termism.217 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The foregoing parts have illustrated, using both academic literature and a series of 
case studies, our hypothesis that corporate managers can suffer from an overlooked form 
of optimism bias that disproportionally affects their assessments of long-term projects. In 
this section, we situate our hypothesis in the larger debate surrounding activism and 
short-termism, analyzing how it plausibly interacts with long-termism, and positing 
several business and legal implications.   
A. Interacting Biases in Capital Markets 
As noted in the introduction, our framework and argument do not dismiss the 
possibility that short-term biases exist and are durable in capital markets. Quite the 
contrary: The long-term bias phenomenon we hypothesize, if true, would do much to 
resolve the curious paradox (articulated above) about why short-term bias could ever 
persist in competitive capital markets with professional investors and fund managers. In 
particular, once one introduces long-term bias it becomes clearer why short-term bias has 
itself survived over many decades, through economic booms and busts. Under the right 
circumstances, short-termism can serve as an effective counter ballast for limiting and 
bridling long-termism (and, vice versa).  
 
To get a feel for how this interaction might work, consider our previous example from 
Table 2, and assume that the manager values the short-term (ST) project at its actuarially 
value (with equal 50% probabilities of success / failure), but optimistically accords a higher 
                                               
217 Furthermore, the SEC has charged Navistar and Ustian for misleading investors about the EGR likelihood 
to succeed in the company’s 2011 fillings. The company has settled with no admission of wrongdoing, while 
Ustian is still in settlement discussions with the SEC. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, Litigation Release No. 23507 / March 31, 2016, Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Daniel Ustian, Civil Action No. 16-cv-3885 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23507.htm; Eric Miller, Former Navistar CEO 
Daniel Ustian, SEC Ready to Discuss Settlement, TRANSPORT TOPICS  (Sep. 5, 2017) available at 
http://www.ttnews.com/articles/former-navistar-ceo-daniel-ustian-sec-ready-discuss-settlement; See also 
Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah Zechman, Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial 
misreporting, 53 J. OF ACC. AND ECON. 311 (2012) (finding that “overconfident executives are more likely 
to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional 
misstatements.“) 
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assessment (of 60%) to the long-term (LT) project.  The manager thus assesses the ST 
project to have expected value of 260 (correctly), and reckons the LT project to have 
expected value of 300 (reflecting upward bias). If left to her own devices, she will thus 
honestly (though erroneously) pursue the LT project.  Now suppose an activist investor 
who owns a 20% stake of the company (and exhibits no biases) recognizes the manager’s 
mistake and is considering launching a proxy contest to force a change of strategy to ST. 
Suppose further that the activist will incur a non-recoverable cost of 5 in order to execute 
the contest, which (for simplicity) we assume will be 100% effective. If the activist is 
successful, she will gain a value of 52 (or 20% of the ST project’s payoff of 260) and give 
up a value of 50 (20% of the “true” actuarial value of the LT payoff of 250), producing a 
gross gain of 2.  The activist would nevertheless abstain from launching the proxy contest, 
however since her gross gain (2) is below her cost of launching the contest (3).  She would 
know (with certainty) that the manager was long-term biased, but the private costs of doing 
anything about it would be prohibitive. 
 
Suppose instead that in addition to the manager’s long-term bias, the activist was also 
biased herself in the opposite direction—in favor of the ST project. Specifically, suppose 
she assesses ST it a 60% success probability (while still judging the LT project’s success 
accurately at 50%).  Now the activist would perceive the ST project to be worth 272 in 
expected value, so that a successful proxy contest would deliver her a (perceived) payoff 
of 54.4 (20% of 272), less a value of 50 (20% of the LT payoff of 250), thereby netting her 
a gross gain of 4.4.  In this case, the activist will find it profitable to launch the proxy 
contest, increasing firm value (albeit by less than she perceives) and delivering greater 
overall value to all shareholders.  Note that if the manager were not biased to begin with, 
then the activist’s short-termism would potentially be a negative force (rather than a 
positive one). To be sure, the interaction of long- and short-term biases probably does not 
always result in perfectly optimal outcomes; but by plausibly interacting in this way, short-
term bias and long-term bias will tend to mitigate one another’s greatest shortcomings.  
 
Our Framework also helps to explain other puzzling observations. For example, 
consider the findings of a positive market response to an announcement that a hedge fund 
activist has purchased company stock and is engaging management.218 This empirical 
result, which has was confirmed in numerous studies, suggests that investors view the 
intervention as valuable. Critics of hedge fund activism, however, have argued that this 
result suggests that investors are also short-sighted, that is, they are happy to receive higher 
payouts in the short-term, while ignoring the long-term consequences.219 Under ordinary 
circumstances, this interpretation would follow only if financial markets were persistently 
incapable of pricing the long-term effect of activism, an assumption seems somewhat of a 
stretch.220 Furthermore, the market response to activism varies significantly across firm, 
                                               
218 See Brav et al, Firms Performance, supra note 14. 
219 See supra Part II. 
220 See e.g., Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 8, at 1123 (“For hedge fund activism to reduce the 
wealth of shareholders in the long term, it must be the case that (i) the elevated stock-price levels following 
13D filings represent inefficient market pricing that fails to perceive the expected long-term costs of the 
intervention”) 
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and is sometimes negative. 221 Why would similarly afflicted short-term investors respond 
negatively to hedge fund engagements in some firms and positively in others? Under this 
Article’s account, capital market price responses might also be due to management side 
factors. For example, a positive market response could reflect rational market satisfaction 
with the derailing of an undesirable long-term project that was itself the artifact of long-
termism. More generally, the account offered here predicts that market response might vary 
across firms, activists, and investments – depending on the extent of long-term 
(management-side) bias and short-term (investor-side) bias that are involved in any 
particular situations. 222  
B. Business Implications 
       The framework developed above—and the symbiotic interaction between long-
termism and short-termism—have several implications for business operations. We 
chronicle three of them here: business investment, investor payout, and firm governance. 
1. Overinvestment  
Short-termism has been a constant concern of corporate America’s policy makers, 
lawyers, academics, business commentators. Under conventional wisdom short-term gains 
always come at the expense of superior long-term investments and growth, and accordingly 
impose significant inefficiency costs on firms and investors. As leading corporate Lawyer 
Martin Lipton harshly warns: 
 
“In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on 
American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the 
expense of long-term value. “223 
 
Yet, as we have argued above, managers often have incentives to overinvest in long-
term investments. As a result, the widely held assumption that short-term pressure always 
comes at the expense of long-term performance and growth seems suspect. Short-term 
pressures (even less-than-rational ones) could limit overconfident long-term investment, 
and consequently improve long-term performance and growth. Thus, the finding that hedge 
fund activism has led to less investment in R&D—which is often said to be one of the 
strongest pieces of evidence against hedge fund activists—by itself does not imply that 
activism is either damaging or valuable to shareholders.224 Rather, it raises an empirical 
question – what type of investments are less likely to go through due to activism: desirable 
or undesirable ones? If R&D levels were excessive due to long-term bias, and activism 
reduces inefficient overestimated investments, then short-termism would contribute to 
                                               
221 Coffee & Palia, supra note 8. 
222 Barzuza & Talley, supra note 39. 
223 See Lipton, Important Questions, supra note 4.	
224 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 576. 
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long-term profitability and growth.225 Consistent with this possibility, two recent studies 
find that while activism reduces investment in R&D and CAPEX in general, it also leads 
to increased returns on assets, and higher output measures (such as more patent 
registrations and citations).226  
 
To be sure, some others have posited that short-termism could play a role in limiting 
overinvestment. Yet, the argument that managers overinvest relied largely on an agency 
cost theory, and did not consider modern executive compensation structures. The common 
overinvestment theory – empire building – posits that managers have personal benefits 
from increasing the size and scope of their firms, which they achieve via investments and 
acquisitions. First, the argument goes, by purchasing other companies, managers can 
arguably increase their own compensation.  Second, they increase their visibility and 
importance. Third, they increase the company’s diversification. Yet, as Coffee and Palia 
argue, executive compensation today ties compensation to firm performance. Thus, if 
empire building harms the company, executives won’t pursue it. The long-termism 
approach we posit, however, does not turn on agency cots theory, and thus is less 
susceptible to this criticism. Since it is driven by overconfidence, incentive-based 
compensation does not necessarily mitigate long-termism; quite the contrary. 
Overconfident managers—who genuinely (but mistakenly) believe in the quality of their 
long-term investments—are encouraged to invest more if their compensation is tied to firm 
value. 227  Indeed, these managers typically negotiate a compensation package that is 
sensitive to firm value.228  
2. Investor Payouts 
Another criticism of activist hedge funds concerns the pressure they frequently exert 
to increase shareholder payouts. Fearing these pressures, it is argued, firms sacrifice R&D 
and other long-term investments. Possibly consistent with this behavior, shareholder 
payouts of S&P 500 companies recently reached 90% of their income.229 And accordingly, 
investment in R&D has declined. Hedge fund pressure, in turn, is motivated by their needs 
for liquidity and the pressure that they face from their investors.  
 
If, however, managers overinvest in long-term assets like R&D due to long-termism, 
forcing shareholder distributions could curb these overinvestments. To be sure, disbursing 
inside capital can sometimes limit desirable investments. Yet, the pressure to increase 
                                               
225 Coffee & Palia acknowledge the potential argument that R&D level was excessive. Yet, they argue, since 
managers are compensated for long-term performance they have no incentives to overinvest. See Coffee & 
Palia, supra note 8, at 550. Yet, overconfidence is not cured by incentive-based compensation. Since 
overconfident managers believe in their long-term projects, long term compensation will incentivize them to 
invest more rather than less, in those long-term projects. See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29. 
226 See Brav et al., The Real Effects, supra 10; Brav et al., Innovation, supra note 10.   
227 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29 (“Specifically, standard incentives such as stock- and 
option-based compensation are unlikely to mitigate the detrimental effects of managerial overconfidence.”) 
228 See Humphery-Jenner et al., Overconfidence & Compensation, supra note 118. 
229 See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity. 92 HAR. BUS. REV. 46 (2014) 
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payouts will tend disproportionally to limit those investments that are driven by 
overconfidence. As discussed above, overconfidence thrives on the availability of internal 
cash flow (or “house money”) of the firm.230 If there is lightly-monitored capital available 
within the company, overconfident managers are more likely to use it for investments.231 
When such resources are not available, in contrast, they will be forced to raise it externally 
and are less likely to invest, presumably since they believe that their company is 
undervalued, and external finance is thus too costly.232 Placing pressure on the distribution 
of internal funds, thus, disproportionally reduces overconfident investments.  
 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the pressure to increase 
payouts will limit the most problematic types investments. Value destroying acquisitions 
by overconfident managers, for example, are more likely and more harmful when they are 
financed from internal funds.233 Similarly, the inclination to overinvest is weaker when 
managers cannot rely on internal finance, and must “sell” their plans to outside 
financiers.234 This payout pressure thus affects overconfident CEOs more than it does 
others. Indeed, it is hardly a coincidence that in the three case studies explored above – 
Yahoo, AOL and Navistar – the companies were generating significant internal cash flows, 
which were in turn used to underwrite the long-term strategies. The activist hedge funds 
that intervened, accordingly, demanded that the managers distribute some of these cash 
flow to shareholders rather than reinvest it. Thus, one way to understand the pressure to 
increase payouts is that so doing forces managers to invest (at least in part) from external 
funds rather than from internal funds, pitching for and raising capital in the market for their 
investments. Only if they pass the market test for these investments they should pursue 
them. Consistent with this interpretation, Fried and Wang recently found that while firms 
payout more than 90% of cash flow, they also issued new equity in significant value.235 In 
particular, after new issuances are taken into account, the net payouts to shareholders, are 
around 41%, less than half of the total payouts.236 
3. Firm Governance 
Our arguments may also have implications for firm governance. Long-termism, since 
it is driven by overconfident management, underscores the need in effective and engaged 
directors.237 Board members could provide an immediate feedback that could (at least 
                                               
230 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29. 
231 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29. 
232 Id. 
233 See Malmendier & Tate, Acquisitions, supra note 30 (finding that overconfident CEO are likely to make 
value destroying acquisitions, and the effect is stronger “if they have access to internal financing.“) 
234 See Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29 (finding that overconfident CEOs “overinvest when 
they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing.” and that this 
“sensitivity of investment to cash flow is strongest for CEOs of equity-dependent firms, for whom perceived 
financing constraints are most binding.”)	
235 Fried & Wang, supra note 31. 
236 Id. 
237 Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29, at 36 (“the results confirm the need for independent and 
vigilant directors”) 
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potentially) constrain overconfidence and long-termism. Empirical studies on the passage 
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the ensuing requirement to implement majority of 
independent directors found that effects have been particularly salient in firms with 
overconfident managers. In firms whose managers were classified as overconfident, 
investment declined significantly and firm performance has increased.238  Independent 
directors thereby limited investment in projects that were likely to be overestimated by 
management.239 
 
Activists increasingly nominate members to firms’ boards, more and more via 
settlements with firms’ management. Such board members, this Article suggests, could 
play an important role in limiting overconfident, undesirable investments. And some 
evidence is indeed supportive of activists’ directors adding value to firms. 240 To begin 
with, when activists gain board representation they hold stock in the target for a median of 
3 years. Second, the study finds long-term improvement in operating performance–during 
the five years following activism, returns on assets (ROA) increased in 2% in average – for 
these firms. 241 The authors then conclude that: 
 
[T]he relatively long-term holding period in cases where activists become directors, positive 
stock market effect, and long-term operating performance improvements seem inconsistent 
with activist directors being short-termist.242 
C. Legal Policy Implications 
      Our arguments also bear on several legal and regulatory reforms that are at various 
stages of progression. Most of them are motivated by the view that unalloyed short-
termism impairs the proper functioning of capital markets. When one views short-
termism alongside long-termism, however, the likely effects of these reforms become 
somewhat harder to evaluate. 
1. Activist Restrictions, Quarterly Reporting, and Dual Class IPOs 
 
As noted in Part 2, significant concerns with respect to short-termism have lead policy 
makers, judges, academics, and practitioners—including many who usually object any 
form of regulation in corporate law—to advocate regulatory changes to curb short term 
investing and encourage long-term management. Several statutory or regulatory reforms 
currently loom large.  Most immediately, Congress will soon consider the proposed 
Brokaw Act, which would require greater disclosures and limit traditionally profitable 
                                               
238 See Banerjee et al., Overconfidence & SOX, supra note 100.  
239 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 574-576 (surveying studies that find that hedge fund activism is 
associated with a decline in R&D investment).  
240 See Ian Gow, Sean Shin & Suraj Srinivasan, Activist Directors: Determinants and Consequences, HBS 
Working Paper 14-120 June 26, 2014, available at https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-
120_451759fe-d298-4072-81d1-b007fd4d5bc0.pdf 
241 Id., at 3. 
242 Id., at 4.  
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strategies of hedge fund activists. 243  The concern of short-term bias, as expressed by co-
sponsoring Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) is the direct and almost sole motivation for 
the Act: “We cannot allow our economy to be hijacked by a small group of investors who 
seek only to enrich themselves at the expense of workers, taxpayers and communities.”244  
 
If passed, the proposed Act – named after a Wisconsin town whose century-old paper 
mill was shuddered by an activist hedge fund – would direct the SEC to amend section 
13(d) reporting rules in several respects.245 Most notably, the amendment will shorten 
hedge funds’ reporting window to investors, after they cross the 5% ownership threshold, 
to four days.246 Under current law, any investor who buys more than 5% of a firm’s shares 
is obliged to file a 13D disclosure form that reports the investor identity, ownership, 
whether the investor has an intention to take over the company, and other relevant details. 
At present, investors crossing the threshold have a 10-day window to file a 13D from the 
day they become a beneficial owner (that is when they own more than 5%). When a 13D 
is filed, the market learns (often for the first time) that the firm was targeted by a hedge 
fund activist, which typically triggers a significant positive market response. Thus, hedge 
fund managers typically accumulate more shares within the 10-day window before the 
price increase takes hold. Shortening the window to 4 days will limit the amounts of shares 
that hedge funds can buy in pre-announcement market price, and in turn their overall profits 
from activism. Second, the amendment will broaden the disclosure obligation’s 
applicability to cover short positions and derivatives.247 Third, the Act will broaden the 
definition of “group” for 13D purposes, explicitly including “wolf packs” of coordinated 
hedge funds purchase parallel initial blocks.248 To the extent that short- and long-termism 
counter-balance one another, however, the reforms proposed by the Brokaw Act may well 
disrupt that balance in a way that disserves shareholder interest. 249 
 
Similarly, the concern of short-term bias and its effects on long-term growth has led 
to proposals to eliminate the requirement that firms will make their performance public 
every quarter. In a recent publication the Conference Board called to replace quarterly 
reports and guidance with long-term, possibly a 1-year guidance. 250  And, after a 
                                               
243 See Brokaw Act, supra note 11; an earlier version was submitted in 2016 but was not voted on. See 
BROKAW ACT, S. 2720, 114TH CONG. (2016). 
244 See Danna Borak & David Benios, Democrats Take Aim at Activist Investors, WSJ (March 17, 2016), 
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-take-aim-at-activist-investors-1458251491 
245 See Brokaw Act, supra note 11. 
246 Id., at 2. 
247 Id., at 8. 
248 Id., at 12-13. 
249 We observe that much of the public rhetoric surrounding the Brokaw Act appears to focus on non-
shareholder interests—in particular that of the laid-off workers the Act’s eponymous Wisconsin town. As 
discussed elsewhere in this article, a stakeholder-oriented perspective might rationalize certain types of long-
term deference, but only if so doing compares favorably to a host of other, more direct means to redress 
stakeholder interests more directly.  See notes 41-44 supra, and notes 268-70 infra, and accompanying texts. 
250 Martin Lipton, Legal & General Calls for End to Quarterly Reporting, HARV. L. SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 18, 2015), available at http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/08/19/legal-
general-calls-for-end-to-quarterly-reporting/ 
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Presidential Tweet, the SEC issued a notice for public comment on the proposal. 251 
Advocates of these policies tend to cite short-termism as well as compliance costs that 
typically are associated with quarterly reporting. 252 Our analysis suggests, however, that 
curbing quarterly feedback could also result in more costly forms of long-termism. A better 
direction for federal regulation might be to account of how short-termism and long-termism 
interact with (and sometimes counteract) one another, with the goal of minimizing the costs 
of long-termism and short-termism. 
 
Our analysis also helps shed light on another growing trend: the increasing frequency 
of companies to go public with a “dual class” stock structure—under which some shares 
(typically the ones belonging to the founders) have significantly more votes per share than 
the company’s common stock (purchased by outside investors). The structure usually 
results in a governance regime with significant separation of ownership and control. That 
is, founders retain sufficient votes to control the firms even though they own only a small 
fraction of the economic ownership stakes, and they bear only a part of the consequences 
of their decisions. Dual class structures have proven highly controversial of late, and some 
securities regulators around the world prohibit it (but not the United States, yet253 ).  
Scholars have come down on both sides, with some excoriating the practice254 with others 
offering explanations as to why dual class stock may increase value (usually by deterring 
short-term focused investors from intervening in the founder’s long-term project and 
possibly allowing them to pre-commit not to do so).255 Our analysis suggests, however, 
that while founders may sometimes be right in their assessment, when the embrace of dual 
class structure is the product of managerial optimism with respect to long-term 
investments, the decision may be wasteful. That said, we are reluctant to advocate for a 
blanket prohibition on dual class stock (as others have championed256). It is difficult indeed 
for outsiders to unpack the motivations of a founder who embraces a dual class structure: 
it may be due to overconfidence (and thus value-eroding); but it could just as easily be due 
                                               
251 See Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, 33-10588, 34- 84842 (Dec. 18, 
2018) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/33-10588.pdf). 
252  See Suresh Nallareddy, Robert Pozen & Shivaram Rajgopal, Consequences of Mandatory Quarterly 
Reporting: the UK Experience. Unpublished manuscript 2016, Columbia University, Duke University, and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2817120 
253 This could certainly change: at least one sitting SEC commissioner has openly entertained the prospect of 
prohibiting perpetual dual class capital structures. See Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr., “Perpetual Dual-
Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty” (February 15, 2018) (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporate-royalty). 
254 See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 101 
VA. L. REV. 585 (2017). 
255 See e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 137–38 (1987); Cf. Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 36 (Dual-class allows a founder to 
pursue a valuable idiosyncratic vision, that investors might mistakenly undervalue).   
256 See e.g., Letter from the Council of Institutional Investors to Edward S. Knight, Executive Vice President 
and General Counsel, NASDAQ OMX Group (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.cii.org/ 
files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_27_14_CII_letter_to_nasdaq_one_share 
_one_vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG32-DGL8]; Cf. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 254 (promoting sunset 
provisions for dual-class structures).  
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to a founder’s genuine desire to protect a project that is inherently difficult for outsiders to 
assess. Moreover, the founder might simply place idiosyncratic value on maintaining 
control, and is willing to incur the costs of doing so in the form of the price discount that 
outside investors will no doubt impose on the sale (particularly if they are short-term 
oriented).. Whatever their motivation, dual-class founders will internalize the loss. 
2. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties  
As developed in Part 2, Delaware courts have recently begun to float concerns about 
short-termism and its implications for fiduciary conduct. Accordingly, several opinions 
have begun to modify the framework for assessing directors’ fiduciary duties, requiring 
that directors “manage for the long-term” on behalf of “permanent capital” (often favoring 
common shareholders over preferred shareholders holding redemption or exit rights).257 
Under Delaware law, directors typically receive the deference of the business judgement 
rule (BJR): if they were sufficiently informed and not conflicted – the court will not judge 
the wisdom of their business decisions with a hindsight. While directors’ fiduciary duties 
were always understood to require them to act to maximize overall value, the way they 
went about doing so (including the relevant time horizons they employed) was presumed 
to be largely within their discretion. 258  Yet, under the Chancery Court’s emerging 
jurisprudence, a director who acts to maximize short term value may be deemed conflicted 
on that basis alone. Moreover, even a director who is simply nominated by an investor 
deemed to have a short-term horizon might be presumed ipso facto to have a conflict of 
interests with the company and its shareholders. 259   
  
A long-termist account of fiduciary duties not only strips directors from the protection 
of the BJR, but it also results in the highest standard of review applied by Delaware courts 
– the entire fairness standard (EF). Under this standard, which is typically reserved for 
direct conflicts of interest such as naked self-dealing, the director has the burden to prove 
the fairness of the transaction process and the fairness of the price. The standard is difficult 
to meet, and a long-termism litmus test may well result in a real risk that the director will 
be found to breach her duty of loyalty to shareholders. Furthermore, while Delaware law 
                                               
257 Trados, supra note 11, at 37 (DEL. CH. 2013) (“Focusing on long-term investments rather than short-term 
gains is the proper role of managers, board members and investors. The goal of corporate law is the promotion 
of long-term value via supporting long term investments.”) Op. Cit. 50. (“the blockholder director’s duties 
to the corporation require that the director manage for the long term, while the blockholder director’s duties 
to the investor require that the director manage for an exit.”).  See also In Re Rural/Metro Corporation 
S’Holders Litig., 102 A.3D 205, 253 (DEL. CH. 2014) 
258 While Laster draws his decision from what he views as a long-standing duty to maximize long term value, 
many view the decision as precedential under Delaware law. See e.g., Jack Bodne, Leonard Chazen & Donald 
Ross, Covington & Burling LLP., VC Laster, Fiduciary Duties and the Long-Term Rule, LAW 360 (March 
11, 2015), available at https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/03/vc_laster_fiduciary_duties_and_the_long_term_rule.pdf (“The 
notion that directors are required to maximize value over the long term and that directors who represent 
stockholders with short-term investment horizons necessarily face a conflict of interest…represent a 
significant change in the law”). 
259 Id., at 50; Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 11,  at 49. 
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provides additional layers to protect directors from monetary liability for a breach of duty 
of care, it does not (usually) award these protections if the director was found to breach her 
of duty of loyalty. The emerging Delaware approach, then, could expose directors that were 
nominated by activists hedge fund, to a nontrivial risk of liability. Although the cases 
plying this new approach to fiduciary duties have thus far largely side-stepped imposing 
real consequences for breach, it is likely a matter of time before the full measure of liability 
exposure begins to emerge. Based on the arguments above, we would advise Delaware 
courts to continue to utilize caution in applying long-termist fiduciary duties—or at least 
to work through how long-term and short-term biases interact with one another. 
3. Executive Compensation 
 
In addition to animating reform proposals in securities regulations and fiduciary duties, 
short-termism concerns have also been caught up in executive compensation practices, 
which some advocates maintain should be changed to better align managers’ wealth to the 
long-term performance of the firm. One commentator has argued that:  
“The most effective way to curb short-termism would be to lengthen the time horizons 
in the compensation packages of asset managers and corporate executives.”260 
Long-term compensation packages, the argument goes, would better align managers 
incentives with those of the long-term shareholders. Furthermore, long-term compensation 
packages also supposedly prevent executives from overinvesting. 261  Yet, when such 
proposals are viewed through the lens of our argument, the creation of long-term incentives 
could actually exacerbate the bias of overconfident managers smitten with their own long-
term investments.262 Indeed, overconfident CEOs show higher demand for incentive-based 
compensation than CEOs that are more dispassionately disposed. 263 And yet, these same 
managers hold onto their options all the way till expiry, typically losing money from not 
exercising them earlier – that is, their predictions turned out to be overly sanguine on 
average. 264  Thus, to the extent that managers already suffer from long-term bias, 
compensation contracts that double down on such biases are unlikely to improve things. 
                                               
260 See Robert Pozen, Curbing Short-termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation 
(BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 2014) (advocating restrictions on selling stock and options, and long-term bonuses 
for executives); see also Martin Lipton & Sebastian V. Niles , The Spotlight on Boards 2017, HARV. L. 
SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (January 29, 2017), available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/29/the-spotlight-on-boards-2017-2/ (“Determine executive 
compensation to encourage and reward executives for accomplishing business goals in furtherance of the 
company’s long-term strategy“). 
261 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 8. 
262 See e.g., Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29, at 36 (“Specifically, standard incentives such as 
stock- and option-based compensation are unlikely to mitigate the detrimental effects of managerial 
overconfidence.”) 
263 See Humphery-Jenner et al., Overconfidence & Compensation, supra note 118. 
264 See e.g., Malmendier & Tate, Investment, supra note 29. 
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4. Takeover Defenses and Just Saying No 
 
Finally, our analysis has implications for Delaware’s approach to takeover cases – in 
the particular circumstances in which the company erects defenses to a hostile suitor. If 
managers have a long-term plan for the company that a hostile bidder might interrupt, 
Delaware courts have consistently allowed them—under the so-called “Unocal” rule265—
to resist the suitor (essentially forever), regardless of the price the bidder is offering to 
shareholders. Delaware courts long ago decided that managers need not convince the court 
that their long-term plan will result in higher better value for shareholders than the bidder’s 
offer. Rather, so long as target-company directors are sufficiently informed and genuinely 
believe that their long-term plan will eventually result in higher gains for shareholders, 
they are allowed to “Just Say No” to the hostile acquirer.266 If managers choose to just say 
no, the inevitable result is that they block the bidder. Thus, shareholders are never 
guaranteed the option of deciding whether to sell their shares at a premium to the bidder, 
even if they have lost faith in management’ long-term plan. To the contrary, the target board 
retains significant power to resist, predicated on the idea that shareholders may mistakenly 
agree to sell their shares out of ignorance as to the incumbent management’s long-term 
plan.267 
 
It is exceedingly unlikely that this area of law (which has been fully baked since the 
late 1980s) will ever change dramatically. That said, our analysis suggests that some 
managers are prone to systematically overestimating the value of their long-term 
investments. Consequently, there is a concomitant concern that managers will mistakenly 
block a high premium offer to shareholders, hoping to protect the sanctity of a long-term 
plan that managers honestly (though incorrectly) subscribe to. Were the Unocal rule being 
authored on a blank slate, our analysis suggests a distinct cost of placing too much 
discretion in the hands of overconfident managers; at the very least, the potential danger of 
long-termism should factor into the analysis. 268  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
A significant and fast-growing literature has increasingly focused on the purported 
dangers of short-term bias within public capital markets. Although the substantive severity 
of the short-termism threat is still a topic of much debate, the argument has galvanized 
enough energy to catalyze both doctrinal change and numerous institutional reform 
                                               
265 See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
266 See e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Incorporated, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 94, 514; 
AFF'D, 571 A.2D 1140 (DEL. 1989). 
267 Id. 
268 In some respects, the dangers of long-termism could still sneak in the back door of the Unocal doctrine, 
through its requirement that a defensive measure must be proportional to the threat posed, and cannot be 
preclusive or coercive as to an outside hostile bidder. See Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2nd 
1361, 1386-88 (Del. 1995). Especially long-termist business plans might dismiss all outside bids 
categorically, and thus could conceivably run afoul of Unocal’s proportionality requirement. 
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proposals.  Motivated by some curious paradoxes within this debate, this Article has 
advanced—for the first time—an argument that, along with short-term pressures, managers 
also suffer from long-term biases. Drawing on the extensive academic literature on 
overconfidence as well as three real-world case studies, this Article has shown that long-
term projects are systematically susceptible to overestimation by managers. The high 
potential upside such projects offer is especially tempting to optimistic managers. And, 
their long gestation periods and inherent vagueness further exacerbate the drivers of 
overconfidence: the illusion of control, skill overestimation, competition neglect, and 
stubborn commitment. Moreover, the factors that usually constrain overconfidence—clear 
and immediate feedback, benchmarking data and learning—are frequently lacking. Our 
arguments are directly relevant to the ongoing debate over short-termism because they raise 
the intriguing possibility of an equilibrium “symbiosis” between short-termism and long-
termism, with each negating at least some of the worst parts of the other, ultimately 
resulting in more balanced (if at times contentious) corporate decision-making. Viewed in 
this sense, long-termism may be the yin to short-termism’s yang. 
 
The framework developed above, moreover, has implications for both business and 
legal/regulatory policy. At the very least, it suggests that we proceed with some measured 
caution in promulgating institutional elixirs to contend with the perceived ills of short-
termism without also attempting to understand their likely side effects with respect to long-
term biases. Thus far, such reform efforts are still in their embryonic stages—and as they 
develop further, we should remain mindful of maintaining a balance between addressing 
short- and long-term biases. 
 
       Although our framework leaves us skeptical about the desirability of unalloyed long-
termist frames for maximizing shareholder value alone, it may still prove to be the case 
that long-term oriented approaches can reliably implement a more fully-realized vision of 
stakeholder governance, where the concerns of employees, customers, creditors, and 
surrounding communities also receive nontrivial weight in the firm’s objective.  
Interestingly, several traditional defenders of uninhibited managerialism appear to have 
become “woke” recently to stakeholder theories of governance. 269 Regardless of whether 
this epiphany is genuine or instrumental (e.g., to preempt less management-friendly 
proposals270), in our view it merits exploring whether long-termist accounts of corporate 
purpose are an effective way to harmonize stakeholder welfare concerns with mainstream 
corporate law (which have traditionally been uneasy bedfellows). If that is the goal, 
however, the promise of long-termism as form of stakeholder governance should be 
compared—on an apples-to-apples basis—with plausible alternatives designed to bring 
about stakeholder governance more directly. Such alternatives include alternative “double-
bottom-line” corporate structures (such as the public benefit corporation), alternative 
                                               
269  See Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm HARV. L. SCHOOL. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 11, 2019), available at  https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-
time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm/. 
270 See notes 41-44, supra. 
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financing arrangements (such as green bonds), tax incentives, and regulatory policy. 271 
This larger debate is almost certainly one worth having, one that raises issues—and 
hopefully attracts solutions—that will make us all better off in the long (if not the short) 
term. 
                                               
271 Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338631  Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=33 8631 
about ECGI
The European Corporate Governance Institute has been established to improve corpo-
rate governance through fostering independent scientific research and related activities.
The ECGI will produce and disseminate high quality research while remaining close to 
the concerns and interests of corporate, financial and public policy makers. It will draw on 
the expertise of scholars from numerous countries and bring together a critical mass of 
expertise and interest to bear on this important subject.
The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI 
or its members. 
www.ecgi.global
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338631 
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law
Editorial Board
Editor  Amir Licht, Professor of Law, Radzyner Law School,   
 Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
Consulting Editors John Coates, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and   
 Economics, Harvard Law School
 Horst Eidenmüller, Freshfields Professor of Commercial Law,  
 University of Oxford
 Curtis Milhaupt, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School
  Niamh Moloney, Professor of Law, Department of Law, London  
 School of Economics and Political Science
Editorial Assistants Tamas Barko , University of Mannheim
 Vanessa Wang, University of Mannheim
 
www.ecgi.global/content/working-papers
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338631 
Electronic Access to the Working Paper Series
The full set of ECGI working papers can be accessed through the Institute’s Web-site 
(www.ecgi.global/content/working-papers) or SSRN:
Finance Paper Series  http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Fin.html 
Law Paper Series  http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Law.html 
www.ecgi.global/content/working-papers
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338631 
